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"Deep in the hearts of most American families glows,
however faintly, the spark of desire for home ownership."
-U.S. Department of Commerce, 1941.
ABSTRACT
Home Ownership For Low-Income People
JoAnn Newman
Submitted to the Department of City Planning in partial fulfillment
of the requirement for the degree of Master of City Planning
Almost two-thirds of the families in the United States owned their
own homes in 1960. Ownership is much less common among low-income than
among middle- and upper-income families. The Federal Government has pur-
sued policies which have contributed to both the high overall rate of
ownership and the relatively low rate for low-income families. With few
exceptions, the Government's housing programs for low-income families
have dealt only with rental housing. In 1967 and 1968, several proposals
for a national home ownership program for low-income families were put
forward. It is probable that an ownership program will be enacted with-
in the next year or two.
The purpose of this thesis is to provide the best available an-
swers as to why and how a national ownership program should be conducted.
The answers are based on existing literature and data and on an analysis
of the experiences of five private nonprofit home ownership projects.
The conclusions as to why ownership should be encouraged include
the fact that there is a significant unmet demand for ownership among
low-income people, that ownership provides an additional housing option,
and that ownership has several beneficial effects. There are two fi-
nancial benefits: (1) mortgage payments are a form of forced savings,
and (2) with the assistance of an ownership program, families can pur-
chase decent homes as cheaply as they formerly rented substandard units.
Ownership also has a clearly beneficial effect on the physical condition
of housing. Owners maintain their homes in much better condition than
do renters.
In addition, it is possible that ownership may have a beneficial
effect on such intangibles as motivation levels and family life, and
can help to upgrade the general quality of a neighborhood. However,
these effects have not yet been proven. It is better to keep the goals
for an ownership program modest than to burden it with overly-high ex-
pectations.
Home ownership also has potential disadvantages. These include
the danger of a decline in the value of the house, the chance that unex-
pected repairs may be needed, the threat of foreclosure, and the relative
lack of mobility. Although these dangers have not as yet been found to
be serious by the ownership projects, they must be kept in mind as poten-
tial costs to be weighed against the potential benefits.
The ownership projects have gained experience which can be used
as the basis for formulating a national ownership program. They have
iii
found the screening and selection of home owners to be a vital part of
an ownership program. Steadiness of employment and past credit record
seem to be the best criteria for selection. Motivation and marital sta-
bility are also good indicators but are more difficult to measure.
The first step to take in encouraging ownership is to make liberal
mortgage financing more readily available, particularly for families in
the $6000 to $8000 income range. For families with incomes between
$4000 and $6000, mortgage interest rates should be subsidized. If these
two programs prove successful, principal as well as interest subsidies
could be provided to families with incomes below $4000. These income
limits are merely indicative; the actual limits should vary with family
size and locality.
There are other measures besides credit manipulation which can
be used in encouraging low-income home ownership. These include (1) the
provision of interim financing, (2) sweat equity, (3) lower insurance
and tax rates, (4) foreclosure insurance, (5) leasing for a trial period,
and (6) ownership counseling and other social services. The assistance
of local sponsor organizations appears to be crucial for the success of
an ownership program, at least initially.
It may not be possible to accomplish the goals of helping low-
income families and upgrading a slum neighborhood with the same pro-
gram. Goals and priorities must be made explicit, and the costs and
dilemmas resulting from each alternative should be fully understood.
An ownership program should not be limited to a specific kind of
housing, but rehabilitated substandard housing should be preferred to
standard housing. So far, the ownership projects have found the supply
of houses adequate for their programs and have not caused an increase
in housing prices.
The ownership projects studied here have in general been success-
ful, but they have operated on an extremely small scale. Government
assistance and financing can help to repeat these successes on a larger
scale. There thus appears to be a beneficial role to be played by a
national low-income home ownership program in the housing policy of
the United States.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The United States is a nation of home owners. In 1960, 62% or
almost two-thirds of all American families owned their own homes.
Seventy-four percent of the families with incomes of $6,000 or more
were home owners, and even among families with incomes below $4,000 the
ownership rate was 51%.
Until the end of World War II, there were more renters than
owners in the United States. From 1890, when information on tenure was
first collected by the Bureau of the Census, until 1940, the ownership
rate fluctuated between 48% and 43%. Then during the 40's it made a
record rise to 55%, and continued to rise sharply during the 50's to
its peak of 62% in 1960.1
This predominance of ownership is true in urban as well as rural
regions. In 1960, 61% of the nonfarm dwelling units were owner-occupied.
Within metropolitan areas, the ownership rate was 59%, and 73% of the
families in metropolitan areas with incomes of $6,000 or above owned
their own homes.2
Home ownership is important in the U.S. not only as a type of
housing accommodation but also as a vehicle for investment and for fam-
ily savings. The purchase of a home is the largest financial transac-
See Table 1, p. 5. Tables are placed as close as possible to
the end of the section in which they are cited.
2 See Table 2, p. 6.
2tion that most families ever undertake.1 Although few families can af-
ford to pay more than a small portion of the total price of the house
at the time of purchase, the house becomes their largest asset over the
years as the mortgage is retired. The home thus acts as a form of
forced savings as well as a place to live. In addition, if the value
of the property appreciates as the mortgage is paid off, the home be-
comes a profit-making investment. Charles Abrams claims that the United
States created a large part of today's middle class by inducing people
to go into mortgage debt during the 1930's and 1940's when property
values were beginning to rise and small investments in homes beginning
to increase manyfold.2
Home ownership is also an emotional and symbolic issue, rival-
ing "motherhood" and "the American way of life" in its emotive content.
It is significant that we speak of "home ownership" rather than "house
ownership," although we speak of "house-hunting," "housing policies,"
and "rental housing." As Robert Weaver, Secretary of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, put it, arguing against home ownership
is "just like being against sin.
Home ownership has been credited with the ability to cure every-
thing from anomie to Communism. The arguments run, in part, that when
1 Richard U. Ratcliff, Real Estate Analysis (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, Inc., 1961), Ch. VIII.
2 Charles Abrams, "The Housing Issue - 1937 to 1967," The
Catherine Bauer Wurster Memorial Address, delivered at M.I.T. on
May 15, 1967, p. 16.
Said on a nationwide radio program on June 10, 1967. Re-
printed in the Congressional Record on June 29, 1967, p. s9184.
a man owns his own home he will feel a part of his -community and will
participate in neighborhood activities, will maintain his home in good
condition, will feel a sense of independence, dignity, and pride as a
man of substantial assets, will be motivated to work harder and strive
for higher goals, will feel closer to his home and thus closer to his
family, and as a small-scale Capitalist will fight Communism and its
principles of public ownership. The argument which is presented most
prominently at the present, in keeping with the most prominent problem
of the day, is that home ownership will eliminate or at least reduce
rioting. This claim, however, like many of the others mentioned above,
is made largely on an impressionistic basis, unsupported by empirical
research or hard data.
The debate about the merits of home ownership, although cer-
tainly lopsided, has not been completely one-sided. In the midst of a
tidal wave of enthusiasm for home ownership in 1945, a book entitled
Home Ownership: Is It Sound? by John P. Dean was published. This book
For example, George Sternlieb, author of a study of slum
ownership,. stated that
"There is no question that the chance of riots in Newark or
for that matter any other major core area would have been substantial-
ly lower with more Negro ownership . . . A man who owns his own home
certainly is not going to endanger it." (U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on
Housing and Urban Affairs of the Committee on Banking and Currency,
Hearings on Proposed Housing Legislation for 1967, 90th Congress, 1st
Session, July 17 - August 7, 1967, p. 1607. Cited hereafter as Senate
Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs, Hearings, 1967.)
The President's Riot Commission recommended a home ownership program
on the grounds that "Home ownership would eliminate one of the most
persistent problems facing low-income families in rental housing -
poor maintenance by absentee landlords - and would provide many low-
income families with a tangible stake in society for the first time."
(Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders [New
York: Bantam Books, Inc., March 19681, p. 477).
sought to present the "little discussed difficulties that arise" from
home ownership, as an antidote to "the case FOR home ownership, already
so amply proclaimed throughout our American culture."1 In 1967, Secre-
tary Robert Weaver attempted to counter the claims that home ownership
would lead to reduced rioting:
I think to promise large numbers of low income people that
in the immediate future that they are going to be able to
achieve home ownership is a snare and a delusion and it can
be a cruel hoax because in many instances with these extreme-
ly low down payments, with these long periods of loans after
three years they will have a negative equity. And.if they
lose their jobs, or if they are sick, they will lose their
home. And if you think you have disillusionment and you
think you have despair and potential violence in the ghetto 2
now, what's going to happen if this occurs in large numbers?
Despite these intermittent warnings and criticisms, however, the com-
mentary from Andrew Johnson's involved defense of home ownership in
18503 to Lyndon Johnson's statement in 1968 that "home ownership is a
1 John P. Dean, Home Ownership: Is It Sound? (New York: Harper
& Brothers Publishers, 1945), pp. 7-8.
2 Said on a nationwide radio program on June 10, 1967. Re-
printed in the Congressional Record on June 29, 1967, p. S9184.
Speaking on behalf of the proposed Homestead Act, Johnson said:
"It would create the strongest tie between the citizen and the
Government - he would with cheerfulness contribute his proportionable
part of the taxes to defray the expenses of the political system under
which he lived. What a powerful league it would form between him and
the Government! What a great incentive it would be to obey every call
of duty - at the first summons of the clarion note of war, his plough,
in fact, would be left standing in its half-finished furrow, the only
plough-horse would be converted into a war-steed, his scythe and sickle
would be thrown aside, his whole armor buckled on, and with a heart full
of valor and patriotism, would with alacrity rush to his country's
standard - then, if necessary, pursue the enemy even to the water's
edge, and there, if unyielding, meet him amidst the dust of battle and
the din of arms. If in the struggle he should be outnumbered or borne
down by superior discipline, in the last dread hour of death, how con-
soling the reflection would be - how strengthening to the soul: I
perish in defending that which is right, and a Government that has
TABLE 1
HOME OWNERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES, 1890-1960
% of Occupied Units
Owner - Occupied
% of Occupied Units
Renter - Occupied
47.8%
46.7
45.9
45.6
47.8
43.6
55.0
61.9
36.9%
36.9
38.6
4o.8
46.0
41.1
53.4
61.0
52.2%
53.3
54.1
54.4
52.2
56.4
45.0
38.1
63.1%
63.1
61.4
59.2
54.0
58.9
46.6
39.0
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
United States: 1967, p. 727.
Total
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
Nonfarm
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
TABLE 2
HOME OWNERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES, 1960
% of Occupied Units
Owner - Occupied
% of Occupied Units
Renter - Occupied
Total
Inside SMSA's
In central cities
Not in central cities
Outside SMSA's
Urban
Rural
Source: U.S. Census of Housing: 1960, Volume I, Part I, p. 1-2.
61.9%
58.9
47.4
72.7
67.1
58.3
71.2
38.1
41.1
52.6
27,3
32.9
41.7
28.8
cherished dream and achievement of most Americans"1 has been overwhelm-
ingly favorable.
A. Home Ownership and the Federal Government
The government of the United States has not remained neutral
with regard to home ownership. Beginning with the Homestead Act in
1862, it has passed measure after measure which has resulted, directly
or indirectly, in the stimulation of home ownership. The Federal Home
Loan Bank Act of 1932 provided federal support to savings and loans as-
sociations, thereby rescuing the home owners whose mortgages the banks
held. The Home Owners Loan Corporation of 1933 assisted home owners
more directly by acquiring threatened mortgages and refinancing them
at more favorable terms. Neither of these measures, however, had a
significant impact on increasing home ownership in the United States.
The mechanism which did have a significant impact was the Fed-
eral Housing Administration (FHA), created under the National Housing
Act of 1934. The primary goal of the FHA was to stimulate the building
and lending industries; home ewnership was to be a tool for achieving
this goal. Whatever the primary purpose, though, the result - a tre-
mendous increase in the number of home owners -- cannot be denied.
The FHA does not itself lend money, but rather insures loans
(Footnote 3 continued from p. 4)
provided a home and an abiding place for my wife and for my children."
(Congressional Globe Appendix for July 25, 1850, p. 951, quoted in
John McClaughry, "The Rediscovery of Home Ownership" [unpublished
manuscript], p. 1-14.
1 "Message on the Cities," delivered to Congress on Feb. 22,
1968. Reprinted in the Congressional Quarterly, Weekly Report, March 1,
1968, p. 429.
8made by private banks to mortgagors. From its beginnings, it pursued a
policy of insuring loans with lower interest rates, longer amortization
periods, and smaller down payments than were common at the time. This
led to a general reform in the residential mortgage market, because the
private mortgagees found it necessary to make their terms easier in or-
der to compete with the FHA. The FHA's influence thus went far beyond
the number of mortgages it directly insured.
FHA also conducted a large-scale advertising campaign to per-
suade more families to buy their own homes. The campaign included post-
ers proclaiming the benefits of home ownership, expositions for building
materials dealers, and a series of radio programs on which, each Sunday,
nationally-known speakers told what their home meant to them, "how it
has influenced their lives, their thoughts, and their actions, and what
it can be made to mean to others." 1
From 1936 to 1944, FHA's share of the residential mortgage mar-
ket rose from 1.3% to a high of 23.5%. The FHA played a particularly
significant part in the new house market; in 1943, FHA new housing
starts comprised 80% of total private starts. The liberal mortgage
terms available under Section 203 enabled many thousands of families
who otherwise could not have considered home ownership to buy homes in
the suburbs, thus contributing substantially to the suburban exodus
1 FHA, Radio News of Better Housing, published by the Radio
Section of FHA, FHA form 163, Washington, D.C. (no date given), quoted
in Dean, p. 51.
2 See Table 3, p. 17.
See Table 4, p. 18,
9and perhaps, as Charles Abrams has suggested, to the creation of today's
middle class.
The home ownership boom and the efforts of the FHA did not af-
fect everyone equally, however. Income level continues to be the fac-
tor which correlates most directly with ownership rates. Within metro-
politan areas, only 42% of the families with incomes below $4,000 but
83% of the families with incomes of $15,000 or more own their own
homes. Although ownership rates may seem surprisingly high even among
low-income families, this fact is explained by the high proportion of
elderly families in the low-income category who bought their homes years
ago, when their incomes were higher, and now own them free and clear.
Thus, of the households with incomes below $3,000 who were owners, 52%
had heads of family over 65 years of age. By contrast, of the families
with incomes of $6,000 or more who were owners, only 8% were elderly.,
The relevant basis for comparison by income levels is there-
fore the two or more person household with the head of the family under
65. Of these families in metropolitan areas, only about 1/3 of the
below-$3,000 households were owners in 1960, while 3/4 of the families
with incomes of $6,000 or above were owners. Like low-income people,
Negroes are an excluded group as far as home ownership is concerned.
While 64.4% of whites owned their homes in 1960, only 38.2% of non-
whites did.3
1 See Table 5, p. 19.
2 See Table 6, p. 20,
See Table T, p. 21.
In other words, although it is often claimed that owning is
cheaper than renting, the typical urban poor family rents its house,
whereas the middle and upper classes are owners. If home ownership is
an American ideal, it is an ideal which has been denied to a large seg-
ment of our society. This is the situation which gives credence to
statements like Michael Harrington's that "private ownership is one of
the great myths of American life,"1 or President Johnson's that the
"cherished dream" of home ownership "has always been out of reach of
the nation's low-income families."2
The Federal Housing Administration was established with the ex-
plicit intention of helping low-income families to buy their own homes.
It was believed that the best hope for stimulating the home construc-
tion industry lay in making mortgages available for the large untapped
market of families who previously could not afford to purchase homes.
For the first five years of its existence, the actions of the FHA lived
up to its goals. While incomes and price levels rose from 1936 to
1941, the annual family income of the typical new home buyer insured
under FHA's Section 203 program fell from $2,766 to $2,250. The value
of the average new home insured declined from $5,625 to $5,045, and the
corresponding incomes and property values for existing homes remained
at about their 1936 level. In 1937, 19.8% of the families insured
had incomes of-less than $2,000, whereas by 1941 34.2% of the insured
1 Michael Harrington, The Other America (New York: The Mac-
millan Company, 1962), p. 156.
2 "Message on the Cities," Feb. 22, 1968.
families were in this income group.
The record of the FHA in recent years has been quite the oppo-
site. Throughout the 1950's the income of the average FHA borrower
rose consistently, and at a faster rate than did median incomes in the
U.S. as a whole. From 1950 to 1960, the typical FHA home buyer's in-
come rose from $3,861 to $7,168, while the U.S. median family income
increased only from $3,319 to $5,620.2 In 1950, 56% of FHA Section 203
mortgages on new homes were made to families with incomes of less than
$4,000, who comprised 63% of the total population. In 1965, only 1%
of these mortgages went to families with incomes below $4,000, while
24% of the families in the nation still fell into this income category.3
The most needy quarter of the country's families is thus now virtually
excluded from the benefits of FHA mortgage insurance,
The negligible number of FHA loans going to low-income families
cannot be explained away by saying that these families are not buying
homes or obtaining any kinds of mortgages. The FHA in 1960 insured
only 12% of the mortgagors with incomes below $4,000; the other 88% or
1,743,000 families were both forced and able to obtain conventional
mortgages. By contrast, the FHA held 20% of the mortgages of families
with incomes between $6,000 and $6,999, and 24% of those between
$9,000 and $9,999. Nor is this situation one which can be called un-
See Table 8, p. 22,
2 See Table 9, p. 23.
See Table 10, pp. 24-25,
See Table 11, p. 26.
avoidable or a matter of chance, According to Charles Abrams,
This sudden drop in insured loans to low-income families be-
tween 1950 and 1955 and thereafter - particularly on existing
homes - is explainable neither as an accident nor in terms of
supervening economic factors. All the evidence points to the
fact that it was part of a deliberate policy. Local FHA ad-
ministrations and FHA underwriters are known to want no part
of loans to low income families.1
The discriminatory policy of the FHA continued unabated through
1960. In March, 1961, two months after his inauguration, John Kennedy
asked Congress to broaden the FHA Section 221 program, which at the time
served only families displaced by governmental action, to include any
family of modest income. The 221(d)(2) program which resulted provides
a maximum 35-year mortgage for 97% of the value of the house to families
with "low- or moderate-incomes." To date, however, 221(d)(2) has not
had a significant effect on opening home ownership to lower-income fam-
ilies. The mortgages are at market interest rates plus the 1/2% FHA
mortgage insurance premium, which, particularly at today's high interest
rates, does not bring monthly mortgage payments within the financial reach
of most lower-income families. In addition, although the directives from
the top may have changed, the local FHA administrators and underwriters
who actually issue the mortgages have continued to be conservative. They
remain reluctant to insure in center city areas, where most of the
cheaper housing exists, and reluctant to grant mortgages to low-income
people, who present greater risks as mortgagors.
Between 1961 and 1967, several other programs were enacted which
have had some effect on encouraging home ownership for low-income fam-
ilies. These include: Section 312 rehabilitation loans at 3% for home
Senate Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs, Hearings,
1967, p. 711.
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owners in urban renewal or code enforcement areas; Section 115 grants
of up to $1500 for owners in renewal areas; home ownership provisions
which allow the eventual purchase of units rented under the rent certi-
ficate, rent supplement, or public housing programs; and a relaxing of
the economic soundness requirements for mortgages in riot areas. Most
of these programs, however, even if fully funded and implemented, would
have only a limited impact on increasing the number of low-income home
owners. Even all of these programs taken together could not do for
low-income home ownership what the 203 program did for middle-income
home ownership.
In November, 1966, a federal program was enacted which does
have the potential to make a substantial impact on low-income home own-
ership. Known as the "Sullivan amendment," FHA Section 221(h) provides
3%, 25-year, no-down payment mortgages to families with incomes below
specified maximums who purchase their homes from local nonprofit spon-
soring organizations. Section 221(h) began operating in the middle of
1967, and as of February, 1968, $8.4 million of FNMA funds had been
committed to finance the ownership of 824 dwellings in 89 projects in
42 cities across the country.1
The chief drawback of Section 221(h) is that it establishes a
rather specific mechanism which is perfectly tailored to meet the needs
of the St. Louis home ownership program which served as its model, but
which cannot be applied to the housing situation in many other cities.
1 "HUD Rehabilitation Program Helps Low-Income Families Become
Home Owners," U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development News
Release, Feb. 6, 1968.
The program can be used only for single-family homes which were pre-
viously in substandard condition but which have been rehabilitated by
the nonprofit sponsor. Thus, 221(h) is not suited for use in cities
where there is a shortage of low-priced housing and a need for the con-
struction of new dwelling units, where the housing is already in
standard condition, or in the many center city areas where multi-family
dwellings predominate. Another frequent complaint is that the income
limits for the program are too low. And in cities where housing prices
or insurance and tax rates are high, even the 3% interest rate may not
be sufficient to bring home ownership within the means of low-income
families.
The 1967 session of Congress was a home ownership Congress as
far as housing policies were concerned. At least four different home
ownership bills were introduced into the Senate alone; most of the dis-
cussion at the Housing Subcommittee Hearings concentrated on home own-
ership; and the focus of the bill which emerged from the Committee was
a new home ownership program. The proposal which received the most
attention and publicity was the one introduced by Senator Charles Percy
in April of 1967 and cosponsored by all 36 of his fellow Republican
Senators. Senator Percy staked his political career on this bill,
spending most of his time and energy working on its passage, and gain-
ing national fame through the wide-scale reception it received in the
1press.
1 Home ownership has a personal as well as a political signi-
ficance for Senator Percy, as he explained one day at the Subcommittee
Hearings:
"My fanil-y moved 13 times in 17 years during the depression.
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Senator Percy's bill would have established a private nonprofit
National Home Ownership Foundation to make loans to local nonprofit
sponsors for the rehabilitation, construction, and purchase of homes
to be sold to low-income families. Loans would also be made to the new
home owners, at below-market interest rates, with the interest subsidies
to be paid by the Federal treasury. Although the bill itself did not
prescribe income eligibility limits, Percy often told the press that
participants normally would be in the $4,000-6,000 range.
Senators Clark, Mondale, and Ribicoff introduced bills which
would have encouraged home ownership for low- and moderate-income fami-
lies by working through the existing FHA framework. The hearings of
the Senate Housing Subcommittee held during July and August of 1967 con-
sisted largely of testimony about home ownership, although there were
a total of 42 bills on various subjects officially under consideration.
An aura of sanctity surrounded the concept of home ownership at the
hearings, despite the opposition of HUD Secretary Weaver and the Admin-
istration. In the words of Andrew J. Biemiller, who testified for the
AFL-CIO,
(Footnote 1 continued from p. 14)
We were evicted many times. We never had a credit rating where we
could even get a year's lease in some of these years. We were on a
30-day notice, and when we missed that payment out we went.
I know my family saw others who had the ability to get a
stake in a house and make a down payment and own it. Even though they
had a temporary dropoff, none of them were evicted in 30 days. The
courts don't work that fast. The eviction process did.
The renter is the one most subject to being thrown out.
The person who is in his own home has a chance of sticking at
it, and that kind of a chance is what we really are trying to aim
for." (Senate Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs, Hearings,
1967, p. 533).
The fact that home ownership is something of a sacred cow
makes it difficult to criticize such noble-sounding proposals.
To take issue with.. .the National Home Ownership Foundation Act
is almost to put oneself in the position of being accused of
poisoning pigeons in the park.1
The Senate Banking and Currency Committee reported out a home
ownership bill (S 2700), but no action was taken on it during that
session of Congress. In February, 1968, President Johnson proposed
his own home ownership program in his message to Congress entitled "The
Crisis of the Cities." This bill (S 3029) would work through the FHA
to provide subsidized mortgages to low-income families. The families
would pay 20% of their monthly income for mortgage payments, and the
difference between this amount and the total amount of the mortgage pay-
ment would be paid for by the government. The maximum subsidy allowed
to a family would be equivalent to the subsidy it would receive under
a mortgage with a 1% interest rate. Even Secretary Weaver came around
this time: "To own one's own home," he said in support of the measure,
"is to have a sense of place and purpose. Home ownership creates a
pride of possession, engenders responsibility and stability." 2
B. The Scope of This Thesis
It now appears certain that the United States will have a com-
prehensive national program, whatever its form, to encourage home own-
ership for low-income people within the next year or two, The relevant
1 Senate Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs, Hearings,
1967, p. 529.
2 "Statement Before the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Af-
fairs of the Committee. on Banking and Currency," March 5, 1968, p. 6.
TABLE 3
FHA SHARE OF-THE MORTGAGE MARKET, 1936-1962
Nonfarm Residential Mortgage Debt
FHA Share of Total
Dollar Volume
1.3%
3.9
6.3
11.0
13.3
16.3
20.3
23.0
23.5
22.0
16.1
13.5
15.9
18.3
19.0
18.8
18.6
18.2
16.9
16.2
15.7
15,3
16.7
18.3
19.0
19.3
19.3
Source: Derived from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics
of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957, p. 397, and
Continuation to 1962 and Revisions.
Year
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
TABLE 4
FHA NEW HOUSING STARTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL PRIVATE STARTS, 1935-1958
Year
1935 6
1936 16
1937 18
1938 13
1939 34
1940 34
1941 36
1942 55
1943 80
1944 67
1945 20
1946 10
1947 27
1948 32
1949 37
1950 36
1951 26
1952 26
1953 24
1954 23
1955 21
1956 19
1957 18
1958 29
Source: Haar, Federal Credit and Private Housing, p. 33.
TABLE 5
TENURE BY INCOME LEVEL, 1960
Inside SMSA's
Income in 1959 % Owners % Renters
Less than $2,000 42.2 57.8
$ 2,000 - $ 2,999 41.4 58.6
3,000 - 3,999 42.1 57.9
4,000 - 4,999 48.6 51.4
5,000 - 5,999 58.0 42.0
6,000 - 6,999 64.8 35,2
7,000 - 7,999 69.0 31.0
8,ooo - 9,999 72.5 27.4
10,000 - 14,999 77.6 22.4
15,000 or more 83.0 17.0
Source: Derived from U.S. Census of Housing: 1960, Volume II,
Part 1, p. 1-5,
TABLE 6
OWNERSHIP BY INCOME LEVEL, 1960
All families
inside SMSA's
Two or more person
households with head
under 65, inside SMSA's
Owner-
Occupants
INCOME
LEVEL
Less than
$3,000
$3,000 -
$5,999
42%
Renters Owner-
Occupants
58% 35%
$6,000 and 73 27 74 26
above
Source: Derived from U.S. Census of Housing: 1960, Volume II, Part 1,
p. 1-23.
Renters
65%
48
TABLE 7
HOME OWNERSHIP BY COLOR, 1890-1960
Whites
% Owners % Renters
51.5%
49.8
NA
48.2
50.2
45.7
57.0
64.4
48,5%
50.2
NA
51.8
49.8
54.3
43.0
35.6
Nonwhites
% Owners % Renters
19.0%
23.6
NA
23.9
25.2
23.6
34.9
38.2
81.0%
76.4
NA
76.1
74.8
76.4
65.1
61.8
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
United States: 1967, p. 727.
Year
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
TABLE 8
SECTION 203 MORTGAGES, 1936-1941
Average Property Valuation
New Homes Existing Homes
$5,625
5,467
5,326
5,136
5,028
5,045
$4,673
4,705
4,602
4,540
4,600
5,00)4
Median Income of Mortgagor
New Homes Existing Homes
$2,766
2,716
2,603
2, 471
2,416
2,250
$2,470
2,485
2,599
2,501
2,490
2,473
Source: Eighth Annual Report of the FHA, p. 31.
Year
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
TABLE 9
SECTION 203 MORTGAGES, 1950-1960
(Selected Years)
Median Income of Mortgagor
New Homes
$3,861
4,225
4,811
5,139
5,484
6,054
6,803
6,912
7,168
Existing Homes
Median Income In
the U.S.
$4,274
4,726
4,938
5,696
5,669
6,033
6,502
6,575
6,784
$3,319
3,709
3,890
4,173
4,421
4,783
5,087
5,417
5,620
Source: U.S. Senate, Progress Report on Federal Housing Programs 1967,
p. 53; and U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Re-
ports, Series P-60, Number 53, p. 4.
Year
1950
1951
1952
1954
1955
1956
1958
1959
1960
TABLE 10
INCOMES OF MORTGAGORS INSURED BY FHA SECTION 203, 1950-1965
(One-Family Homes)
1950
Income of Mortgagor
Less than $4,000
$ 4,000 - $ 4,999
5,000 - 5,999
6,000 - 6,999
7,000 - 9,999
10,000 - 14,999
15,000 and over
Total
Income of Mortgagor
Less than $4,000
$ 4,000 - $ 4,999
5,000 - 5,999
6,000 - 6,999
7,000 - 9,999
10,000 - 14,999
15,000 and over
Total
Income of Mortgagor
Less than $4,000
$ 4,000 - $ 4,999
5,000 - 5,999
6,000 
- 6,999
7,000 - 9,999
10,000 - 14,999
15,000 and over
Total
Income Distribution
of 203 Mortgagors
New Homes Existing Homes
55.6%
24.0
9.7
5.8
4.1
0.7
0.1
100.0
42.8%
24.1
11.9
9.4
8.7
2.5
0.6
100.0
Income Distri-
bution in U.S.
63.2%
13.6
9.0
5.2
5.8
}3.2
100,0
1955
11.2%
26.5
21.0
16.8
19.9
4.0
0.6
100.0
10.6%
24.6
19.9
16.5
21.8
5.5
1.1
100.0
43.2% -
15.4
12.7
9.5
12.9
4.8
1.4
100.0
1960
1.3%
7.6
17.0
21.2
38.9
12.6
1.4
100.0
3.0%
11.3
19.4
19.8
34.0
11.2
1.3
100.0
31.5%
10.5
12.8
10.8
20.0
10.6
3.7
100.0
TABLE 10, Continued
1965
Income of Mortgagor
Less than $4,000
$4,000 - $ 4,999
5,000 - 5,999
6,000 - 6,999
7,000 - 9,999
10,000 - 14,999
15,000 and over
Total
Income Distribution
of 203 Mortgagors
New Homes Existing Homes
1.1%
4.3
12.2
19.3
40.4
19,9
2.8
100.0
1.7%
6.2
13.1
19.4
38.4
18.5
2.7
100.0
Income Distri-
bution in U.S.
24.3%
8,0
9.3
9.3
24.1
17,3
7.,6
100,0
Sources: Derived from U.S. Senate, Progress Report on Federal Housing
Programs, 1967, p. 56; and U.S. Bureau of the Census, Sta-
tistical Abstract of the United States: 1967, p. 333.
TABLE 11
TYPE OF MORTGAGE BY INCOME LEVEL OF MORTGAGOR, 1960
One-Unit Homeowner Mortgaged Properties
% With FHA- % With VA- % With Conven-
Income of Insured Insured tionally Financed
Mortgagor First Mortgage First Mortgage First Mortgage
Less than $2,000 10.9% 8.6% 80.5%
$ 2,000 - $ 2,999 15.0 12.8 72.2
3,000 - 3,999 12.0 18.4 69.6
4,ooo - 4,999 16.6 22.2 61.2
5,000 - 5,999 18.9 26,3 54.,8
6,ooo - 6,999 20,1 27.6 52.3
7,000 - 7,999 22.0 29.2 48,8
8,000 - 8,999 19.8 26.0 54.2
9,000 - 9,999 24.4 27.3 48,3
10,000 - 11,999 19.4 25.0 55.6
12,000 - 14,999 20.4 17.2 62.4
15,000 or more 10.3 8.7 81,0
Note: Rows add across to l00%.
Source: Derived from U.S. Census of Housing, 1960, Volume V, Part I,
p. 9.
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question now is not whether home ownership should be encouraged but how
this should be done; the first question appears to have been answered
already by politicians and public opinion.
As evidenced by the variety of different home ownership mea-
sures which have been put forth within even the last year, there are a
number of different forms which a national program can take, and a num-
ber of different options open for its operation at the local level. The
particular proposal now being considered by Congress (S 3029) was large-
ly a result of the testimony heard at the 1967 Hearings and of the
opinions and prejudices, personal and political, of the men who prepared
the bill. Ideally, a national home ownership program should be based on
a nation-wide, five-year experimental program which could test out dif-
ferent theories and modes of operation. But, as noted above, a broad-
scale bill is likely to be passed very soon, and no such experimental
program has even been suggested.
The purpose of this thesis is to provide the best answers avail-
able at the present time, based on research and facts rather than im-
pressions and opinions, as to how a national home ownership program for
low-income people should be formulated and conducted. In order to ar-
rive at the best available answers, two types of research have been
undertaken. The first or "theoretical" type included data collection
and analysis and the reading of articles, books, speeches, studies, and
any other written material which pertained to home ownership and low-
income people. The second or "empirical" method involved the examina-
tion of the experiences of five private, small-scale groups around the
country which for the past three to fifteen years have been helping
low-income families to buy their own homes. There are perhaps twenty
such private home ownership projects at various stages of maturity in
the United States, all running programs similar to the one which would
be established by a national home ownership act. Yet these projects
are largely unknown to one another, and no one seems to have conducted
an analysis or compilation of their experiences and mistakes.
In fact, only a couple of these projects have written reports
about themselves. Few have kept decent records of their own operation,
and only one has undergone any kind of scholarly study or objective
self-evaluation. The experience gained by these groups must not be
wasted. It can be used to provide perhaps the best basis we have on
which to build a national home ownership program.
The five particular projects chosen for detailed study here
were selected because they are among the oldest and most advanced in
the country, and because they represent five fairly different ways of
working toward the same goal. The five are Better Rochester Living, in
Rochester, New York; the Bicentennial Civic Improvement Corporation, in
St. Louis, Missouri; Flanner House Homes, in Indianapolis, Indiana; the
Interfaith Interracial Council of the Clergy, in Philadelphia, Pennsyl-
vania; and Lincoln Estates, in Gainesville, Florida. The first four
were visited by the author;1 the fifth was studied through an excellent
The author spent a day at each of these projects, interview-
ing the directors, inspecting the houses being converted to owner-
occupancy, and talking with the new home owners. A list of 50 ques-
tions, as well as issues unique to the particular program which arose
during the conversation, were discussed with the directors at each of
the projects. See the Appendix, p.156, for the list of 50 questions,
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and scholarly analysis of the project written as a summary report by its
director.1 Newspaper and journal articles, public relations material,
and testimony from the 1967 Senate Hearings provided supplemental in-
formation for all of the groups.
The discussion in the following pages will center around two
basic questions. First, why should home ownership for low..income people
be encouraged? Second, how should this be done? It might be remarked
that this framework contains a built-in bias by asking "why" rather
than "whether" home ownership should be encouraged. When I first pre-
pared an outline for this study, the question was formulated as "wheth-
er." There was even a slight perverse bias, in the face of the uncriti-
cal and enthusiastic reception being given to home ownership, to make
negative or balancing findings. As research progressed, however, it
became apparent that some form of home ownership program was inevitable.
In addition, as I visited the home ownership projects around the coun-
try and saw the work they have done, I too became convinced that there
is at least some beneficial role which can be played by a low-income
home ownership program in improving the housing and lives of the na-
tion's low-income families. Although an effort will be made to use
only documented facts and evidence in the discussion which follows, it
seems best to make my feelings explicit at the outset.
The important question of how a home ownership program should
be administered and funded at the national level will not be considered
1 Gloria Richards and Ralph H. Blodgett, "Interim Summary Re-
port on Low-Income Demonstration Housing Project No. Fla., LIHD - 1,
Contract No. H-605," (Bureau of Economic and Business Research, Univer-
sity of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, July 20, 1966).
30
in this thesis. Much of the controversy over the Percy bill and other
proposals at the 1967 session of Congress concerned whether the home
ownership program should work through the existing FHA structure or
through a new organization established for that purpose. Certainly
this is a significant issue, and the very vitality of a home ownership
program may depend upon it. However, theories and arguments notwith-
standing, it is a question which will be decided politically and is
therefore outside the scope of the research done here.
The home ownership discussed in the following pages will be pri-
marily urban home ownership, There are groups and programs presently
promoting low-income home ownership in rural areas, but the principles
involved are sufficiently different to warrant a separate analysis,
And except for a brief mention of condominiums and cooperatives for the
sake of completeness, only simple ownership will be studied. The topic
of condominiums or cooperatives each deserves many theses of its own.
The term "low-income" as used in the phrase "home ownership for
low-income people" is being left deliberately vague for the first part
of this paper. A definition of low-income families as those whose in-
comes have been too low to buy a home will be adequate for the follow-
ing two chapters. Then, in Chapter IV, a detailed analysis will be made
of the incomes needed to buy various price houses, and of what kinds of
programs should be provided for families of different income levels.
In the next few pages, each of the five home ownership projects
studied will be described briefly. These summaries will provide a
framework for understanding the conclusions reached later, and will al-
low the subsequent discussion to make references to the projects, to
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draw parallels between them, and to make evaluations without having to
explain the mechanics of the programs each time. Chapters III and IV
will consider the questions of why and how low--income home ownership
should be encouraged, and Chapter V will present a final conclusion and
summary of the suggestions made for a nation-wide program.
CHAPTER II
THE FIVE HOME OWNERSHIP PROJECTS1
A. The Bicentennial Civic Improvement Corporation
The Bicentennial Civic Improvement Corporation (BCIC) in St.
Louis, Missouri, is a private nonprofit corporation formed for the
dual purpose of helping low-income families to buy their own homes and
upgrading a 9-block slum area. BCIC was begun informally in 1963 when
a large Negro family living in the infamous Pruitt-Igoe public housing
project went to its parish priest for assistance in finding better
housing. The priest helped the family to buy a rehabilitated brick row
house in the shadow of Pruitt-Igoe and later found that many other fami-
lies also liked the idea of becoming home owners. He helped these fami-
lies too, and as the program expanded, the need for a formal organiza-
tion to rehabilitate houses and facilitate home ownership became
obvious. In 1964 BCIC was therefore incorporated, with a board of di-
rectors composed of leading citizens in the St. Louis area, and finan-
cial donations from private businesses and individuals,
BCIC operates exclusively within a 9-block area of brick single-
1 See Table 12, p. 48, for a summary of the characteristics of
the five ownership projects.
All statements about the five projects which are not footnoted, both
in this and the following chapters, are based either on general knowl-
edge from newspaper and journal articles and on testimony in the Senate
Subcommittee Hearings, or on personal interviews.
family, semi-detached, and row houses. The houses are structurally
sound but need complete overhauling inside, and because of the high va-
cancy rate in the area can be purchased for only $500-$2,000. BCIC buys
the houses from their absentee-owners, rehabilitates them, and eventual-
ly resells them to low-income families who want better housing and who
want to be home owners. The 9-block area contains about 308 dwelling
units; so far, BCIC has purchased and resold about 75 of these units.
The residents of the area and all of the BCIC home owners are
Negro. The incomes of the families in the program range from $2,500 to
$8,000.
For the first three years of its operations, BCIC relied en-
tirely upon conventional mortgage financing and private funding plus
an OEO grant for administrative expenses. BCIC had an arrangement with
a local bank which enabled its home owners to obtain 100% mortgages,
thus making home ownership possible for families who could not afford to
accumulate down payments. Under this arrangement, BCIC deposited a sum
equal to 20% of the home owner's mortgage in a savings account at the
bank to act as security against the 100% mortgage. When the owner had
reduced his mortgage to 80% of its original value, BCIC was allowed to
withdraw its deposit.
These conventionally-financed mortgages bore interest rates of
6%. In the fall of 1967 BCIC began to use FHA's new 221(h) program,
proposed by St. Louis Congresswoman Lenore Sullivan, which provided the
same 100% mortgages at only 3% interest rates, and which did not require
BCIC to supply any portion of the mortgage. The family pays only $200
in closing costs at the time of purchase. Of the 75 houses done by
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BCIC, the last 10 carry 221(h) mortgages.
About $5000 to $6000 worth of rehabilitation was done on each
conventionally-financed home, bringing the total price of the house in-
cluding acquisition plus rehabilitation to about $6,000 to $7,000, The
home owner had to make monthly payments on a mortgage of this amount of
about $55 to $72, which covered principal, interest, insurance, and
taxes. On the 221(h) houses, the structures had to be rehabilitated
to specified FHA standards, bringing the cost of rehabilitation to about
$8000 and the total price of the house to about $9,500. The monthly
payments on Section 221(h) mortgages at 3% interest rates are thus
about $64, or $4 per month higher than the typical $60 payment on the
6% conventional mortgages. The 221(h) homes, however, are better dwell-
ings, and the owners feel that the difference in quality is easily worth
the $4 per month. As a matter of fact, some of the original participants
in the program have become envious of the newer houses, and are looking
for ways to finance improvements in their homes to bring them up to
221(h) standards.
All of the rehabilitation is presently done by the best contrac-
tor that BCIC can hire. At first, BCIC employed local neighborhood
women to do the wallpapering, painting, and other finishing touches,
but it was later decided that it was better to obtain the more skillful
and efficient services of professional contractors.
As soon as the rehabilitation is completed, the family moves in-
to its new house. In the first 50 houses BCIC did, the family purchased
the house as soon as it took occupancy. Experience showed, however,
that a trial period as a renter was advantageous from the point of view
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of both BCIC and the family, and for the past 25 houses, including the
10 financed by Section 221(h), the family has lived as a renter for a
year. This year gives the families a chance to learn about home owner-
ship and make sure that they want to become owners, and gives BCIC the
opportunity to help- and evaluate the families. The rent money during
this year is used to make the monthly mortgage payments of principal,
interest, insurance and taxes just as if the family were the owner, so
that the mortgage is amortized slightly by the time it is assumed by the
family.
B. Better Rochester Living, Incorporated
Better Rochester Living, Inc. (BRL), is a private nonprofit or-
ganization which helps low-income families to find homes anywhere in
the Rochester metropolitan area, and helps them to purchase the homes
without a down payment by substituting "sweat equity" 1 for cash. BRL
was incorporated in June, 1964, after two years of preliminary organiza-
tion and planning by Mr. Welton Myers, a former farmer and building con-
tractor. During these two years Mr. Myers collected donations of more
than $45,000 from private sources, obtained a commitment from local com-
mercial banks to loan working capital to BRL, and persuaded savings
banks in the area to form a mortgage pool which would make loans to
BRL's home owners.
The way in which low-income families purchase their own homes
through BRL is similar to the way in which a family of any income buys
1 "Sweat equity," a rather abused term at the present, will be
used here to refer to rehabilitation work done by a family in lieu of
cash investment on a house it is purchasing.
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a home on the open real estate market, After the family has been ac-
cepted on the basis of income, credit situation, and employment record,
it selects a local realtor who helps the family to find a house. The
house chosen must need enough rehabilitation to provide the sweat equity
in lieu of the down payment and closing costs, and must be within the
1
price range of the family. BRL has served families with incomes rang-
ing from $3,800 to $7,000, about 50% of whom have been Negro.
After a house is selected, a construction expert employed by
BRL inspects it to determine how much should be offered for the house,
how much rehabilitation the house needs, and how much of the work the
family can do itself. An FHA inspector also inspects the property and
decides what value FHA will insure on the finished house. If these steps
proceed favorably, and if the owners will sell the house at the price of-
fered by BRL, then BRL purchases it; if not, the family looks for another
house, and the process is repeated.
BRL uses.7% money loaned to it by the commercial banks for ac-
quiring and rehabilitating its houses. As soon as the house is purchased
by BRL, the new home owner moves in. In the few cases in which the house
as acquired has been in unlivable condition, enough work was done first
to allow the family to move in, but most of Rochester's housing is in
fairly good condition already.
BRL acts as its own general contractor, hiring subcontractors to
do the rehabilitation; the family involved is one of the subcontractors.
Better Rochester Living uses the rule of thumb that the final
price of the house should not be more than 2 1/2 times the annual in-
come of the chief wage earner.
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For a period of 8 to 12 months, the family lives as a tenant with BRL
as its landlord, while it completes its sweat equity under the direction
of a construction supervisor. The family does such work as painting and
papering, finishing floors and ceilings, and landscaping, while the pro-
fessional subcontractors do heating, plumbing, and structural changes.
The value of the family's labor is figured at prevailing market rates.
The professional rehabilitation work can be done in two weeks or a month
at most, but BRL feel that the educational, motivational, and financial
benefits of sweat equity warrant the 8 to 12 months that it requires.
BRL pays on the average of $T,000-$8,000 to acquire its houses,
and adds about $2,000-$4,000 for repairs, bringing the average total
house price to $8,000-$11,000, The family must do enough sweat equity
to cover the required 3% down payment plus about $500 in closing costs,
When the rehabilitation is complete, the family obtains an FRA-insured
Section 221(j)(2) mortgage at 6% interest for 20 to 25 years. The mort-
gage covers the total sales price minus the down payment and closing
costs, and is used to purchase the house from BRL. BRL includes a fee
of $650 in the price of each house to cover its administrative expenses,
in the hopes of eventually being a break-even operation,
BRL has recently begun to use Section 221(h) 3% mortgages for
families whose incomes fall within the prescribed 221(h) limits. Call-
ing this its "Number 2 Program," BEL is going to accept families who
present greater credit risks than it previously took. These families
will live in their houses as renters for up to 2 or 3 years while they
complete the sweat equity and improve their credit situation. Under
Section 221(h) BRL can obtain 3% mortgages even while the family is a
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tenant, whereas with conventional financing BRL had to pay 7% on its
commercial loan until the family became the owner.
For a $9,500 house with a 221(d)(2) 20-year mortgage, the ave-
rage monthly payment including principal, interest, insurance, and taxes
has been $94. The same house with a 221(h) mortgage would require about
$77.50 in monthly payments. The family's income must of course fall
within the prescribed limits in order to qualify for the 221(h) subsidy;
BRL will continue to use 221(d)(2) mortgages for families whose incomes
are above the 221(h) maximums.
As of February, 1968, 36 families had become home owners under
BRL's first program. Six more were living in fully rehabilitated houses
and were waiting to take title; 48 were in the rental and sweat equity
stage; and 30 were in various stages of negotiation with. the FHA. Under
the 221(h) program, commitments had been received on 8 houses; 16 more
were ready to receive commitments, and 24 were under negotiation. Ap-
proximately another 100 families were either house-hunting or had been
accepted by BRL and were ready to begin looking for a house, BRL is
presently able to handle the acquisition and rehabilitation of about
55 houses at once.
C. The Interfaith Interracial Council of the Clergy
The Interfaith Interracial Council of the Clergy (IICC) is a
private social services organization organized in August, 1964, in re-
sponse to the riots that summer in Philadelphia. The IICC home owner-
ship program is an independently financed and independently administered
branch of the IICC which was separately incorporated in March of 1967.
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It is the youngest of the five ownership projects included in this study,
but the efficiency and ability with which it has been conducted during
the past year have produced instructive results and make it worth con-
sideration here.
IICC1 was funded by an $84,000 grant from the Department of Com-
mercets Economic Development Administration and a $30,000 grant from the
Department of Labor (for the job trainee program, which will be explained
shortly).. Like BRL, IICC originally used only Section 221(d)(2) mort-
gages but is now using 221(h) mortgages for families whose incomes fall
within the required limits. Working capital is borrowed commercially.
Like BCIC but unlike BRL, IICC uses no sweat equity. Its policy with
regard to geographical focus lies somewhere between BRL's entire metro-
politan coverage and BCIC's restriction to a 9-block area. It concen-
trates on particular neighborhoods, but has so far entered three dif-
ferent neighborhoods and would like to expand eventually to work in all
of Philadelphia's slum areas. Unlike both BCIC and BRL, IICC has the
home owners purchase the houses as soon as they move in,
The houses in the Philadelphia slums where IICC operates, like
the houses in BCIC's 9-block area, are for the most part structurally
sound but inside are of even less value than BCIC's. They can thus be
purchased quite cheaply; IICC has been paying from nothing to $1600 per
unit for them. Thousands upon thousands of these deteriorated but sal-
vageable brick row houses line the streets of Philadelphia's ghetto
areas, providing a valuable but as yet largely untapped resource.
1 "IICC" will be used from this point on to refer to the home
ownership program of the IICC.
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IICC essentially guts these shells, replacing everything from
the "soil pipe to the roof," moving stairways, and rearranging the floor
plan to let in more light and air and provide better access. IICC is
quite lucky in that the structures it begins with are often very large,
sometimes containing three floors with three to four rooms per floor.
Spacious homes with as many as seven bedrooms can thus be offered to
large families, a situation which is not possible in most center-city
areas. The houses are rehabilitated in packages of seven, which take
about 12 weeks to complete. As of March, 1968, home owners were living
in 12 houses finished by IICC; 40 more houses were being rehabilitated,
and another 150 were in various stages of negotiation.
IICC's method of operation is quite straightforward, It ac-
quires a group of houses on a particular street, rehabilitates them,
and then resells them to low-income families. First priority is given
to the families presently living in the neighborhood, regardless of
their income. If the family's income falls within 221(h) limits, it ob-
tains a 221(h) mortgage at 3% interest; if not, it takes out a Section
221(d)(2) 6% mortgage. IICC feels that any family that wishes to remain
in the neighborhood and wants to become a home owner should be assisted
to do so. Its experience has been that most families do want to stay
in their present neighborhood if they can obtain decent housing there.
To date, all of IICC's home owners have been from the same block.
Each contractor hired by IICC to do rehabilitation work signs an
agreement to hire and train a certain number (usually five) of local un-
skilled men during the work on IICC property. This is the program for
which the Department of Labor provided a $30,000 grant. Up to $300 per
house will be paid to the contractor for any losses caused by the trainees,
but the contractor must pay the full salary of the trainees himself. The
trainees begin at minimum wages, and eventually may move up to "helpers"
and then to fully-skilled workers. IICC has an employee who makes sure
that the men are actually being trained and "used properly" by the con-
tractors. According to IICC, this program has been well received by the
contractors, who face a severe shortage of construction labor, and has not
been bothered by the unions. Forty-two men have so far gone through the
trainee program and are now employed by the private construction industry
at wages of up to $35-$40 per day.
All of the families served so far have been Negro, but IICC ex-
pects to have some white home owners in the mixed areas it is entering
now. The incomes of the families served have ranged from $3,000 to
$8,400; the prices of the houses, from $8,000 to $11,000. Like BCIC,
IICC includes no additional fee in the price of the house to cover its
own expenses.
On a $10,000 221(d)(2) 30-year mortgage, the IICC home owner pays
about $72 monthly for principal, interest, insurance, and taxes. Under
a Section 221(h) mortgage, the corresponding payment would be approxi-
mately $54. A 3% down payment plus closing costs has been reguired
under 221(d)(2) mortgages, and IICC plans to continue to ask for a down
payment of from $200 to $700 on 221(h) mortgages, depending on what the
family can afford. IICC feels that a home in which no equity has been
invested is like a rented house.
The directors of IICC have incorporated a national organization
to promote home ownership for low-income families. It is called the
National Interfaith Council for Housing and Employment (NICHE). NICHE
recently helped start an ownership project similar to IICC in Camden,
New Jersey.
D. Flanner House Homes, Incorporated
Flanner House Homes, Inc. (FHH), in Indianapolis, Indiana, dif-
fers from the other home ownership projects discussed so far in that it
sells new rather than existing homes, and in that it makes quite exten-
sive use of sweat equity. FHH was incorporated in 1945 in conjunction
with a local settlement house and got off the ground - or "into the
ground," as its director put it -- in 1950. Three hundred and sixty-six
homes were built and sold to low-income families between 1950 and 1965,
when the program ceased operation.
The Flanner House Homes were actually constructed by their future
owners, with the jobs requiring technical knowledge such as plumbing,
heating, and cabinet-making being contracted out to professionals. The
labor or sweat equity provided by the owners equalled from 25% to 39%
of the total value of the house. This meant that on a house worth
$14,000, a mortgage of only about $9,000 would be needed. Each man
spent a minimum of 20 hours per week during the evenings and on weekends
working on his home. The owner's hours of labor were recorded on a time
clock and evaluated at prevailing wages in order to arrive at the value
of the sweat equity contributed.
The homes were built on two pieces of land (one on the west side
and one on the east side of Indianapolis) which had been acquired,
cleared and sold by the Indianapolis Redevelopment Commission. When
the project started, the lots, which average 50'x1301, were purchased
for $ho to $500. Prices have risen steadily since, and similar land on
the edge of the city would now cost perhaps $5,000 per improved lot.
This puts the final price of the houses far beyond the means of the
$3,000 to $6,000 income families that Flanner House served. The high
price of land and the high cost of borrowing money have made continua-
tion of the project since 1965 unfeasible without a government subsidy.
Many of the men who participated in this project had never pre-
viously even held a hammer. Each future home owner first spent a week
in FHH's shop, learning to use tools and the basics of construction.
This was a trial week, during which each man could decide whether he
wanted to participate in the program, and FHH could decide whether to
accept the man. The lumber to be used in the houses was pre-cut in the
shop, and the-walls were pre-ass-embled. Lumber was color-coded, and
other arrangements were made to facilitate the construction process.
When the men had been trained in the shop, they moved in teams to the
construction sites. They worked in groups on the 15 to 30 houses which
were done at a time; no one moved into his house until all of the houses
in that package were completed. The homes usually took from 9 to 18
months to finish.
The money to buy materials and to pay the professional contrac-
tors came from FHH's donated revolving fund of $200,000. When a house
was completely built, the owner obtained a conventional mortgage, usu-
ally at 4 1/2%. to 5 1/2% interest, from one of the cooperating banks.
The mortgage would be used to pay FHH the total value of the house minus
the calculated value of the sweat equity. FHH included a fee for it-
self in the sales price of the house, so that when the project was over
in 1965 a good portion of the donated funds still remained. The houses
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were appraised at values ranging from $12,500 to $15,000, on which the
owner. obtained a mortgage of $9,000 to $9,500. The typical monthly
mortgage payment was about $65.
The Flanner House Homes are modern 3-bedroom ranch-style houses.
The owners could choose from 14 different floor plans and had their
choice of frame or stone exteriors. The houses look less similar than
do the houses in the average middle-class subdivision,
All of the participating families are Negro. What FHH has done
is to create two quiet, attractive Negro subdivisions with. a middle-
class aura for low-income families on the sites of what used to be two
of Indianapolis' worst ghetto areas. The neighborhoods are tree-lined
and well cared-for; the residents, who became acquainted while con-
structing their homes together, have formed strong neighborhood organi-
zations. Flanner House Homes has continued to keep an eye out for land
on which to repeat its project, but is dubious about finding another
site. This type of project seems to be more suitable for rural or
suburban than for urban areas.
E. Lincoln Estates
Lincoln Estates is a private profit-making subdivision of about
250 low-cost homes in Gainesville, Florida. Construction on the sub-
division began in 1961, and most of the houses purchased were financed
with FHA Section 221(d)(2) mortgages. All of the residents of Lincoln
Estates are Negro.
The home ownership project to be considered here is an experi-
ment which was conducted in 50 of the Lincoln Estates homes. It was
financed by the Low-Income Housing Demonstration Division of the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development, and conducted by the Bureau of
Economic and Business Research of the University of Florida. The pur-
pose of the experiment was to test the feasibility of relaxing the FHA
standards for mortgage insurance for low-income people. A demonstration
grant of $104,880 was used to administer the program and to insure
221(d)(2) mortgages for 50 families who had been rejected initially by
the FHA when they applied for insurance.
The demonstration program lasted for five years, from 1963 to
1968. None of the participating families knew that it was a part of the
experiment, although all of the families living in Lincoln Estates knew
that an experimental program was being conducted. During the five years
of the program, all of the families applying to the FHA for 221(d)(2)
mortgages at Lincoln Estates were interviewed by the demonstration staff
as well. The families rejected by the FHA were reconsidered by the
staff, which used its own credit criteria and made deeper investigations
into the family's background. Out of the rejectees, the 50 participat-
ing families were chosen. Assistance with budgeting and credit manage-
ment and general counseling were available to all of the families in the
subdivision.
All of the houses purchased in the demonstration program were
new houses, and no sweat equity was involved. Although the homes were
financed with Section 221(d)(2) mortgages, they were built to meet the
higher Section 203 standards. They stand on lots at least 60'x110t, con-
tain two to four bedrooms, and sold for $9,150 to $13,200. At the begin-
ning of the program, the maximum mortgage allowed under 221(d)(2) was
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$11,000 for 40 years at 5 1/4% interest, but the limits were subsequent-
ly revised to $13,000 for 30 years at 5 3/4%. Monthly mortgage payments
ranged from $58 to $80.
The incomes of the families in the demonstration group ranged
from $3,420 to $8,415, with a median income of $5,096. The incomes of
the other families in Lincoln Estates (the "control group") were from
$2,208 to $11,800, with a median of $4,940. However, the families in
the demonstration program were significantly larger than were those in
the control group, so that their median per capita income was only $936
whereas that of the control group was $1,304.
The focus of study here will be the HUD demonstration project
rather than Lincoln Estates as a whole. The subdivision of Lincoln Es-
tates is not a "home ownership program" in the sense the term has been
used here, but rather is a profit-making business venture. It involved
no new mechanisms for encouraging low-income home ownership. Although
the subdivision was neither visited nor analyzed in detail by the author,
it can be surmised that low land costs and low construction costs allowed
the building of new houses at much lower prices than would be possible
in most urban areas. Lincoln Estates itself therefore offers little in-
structive experience which is transferable to other areas or to a na-
tional home ownership program, except perhaps that the most direct way
to encourage low-income ownership is to produce cheaper housing.
The demonstration project did, however, produce some interesting
results which can be quite useful to a national home ownership program.
These pertain especially to conclusions about the credit aspects of home
ownership, and about the kinds of families that can and cannot become
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successful home owners. The director of the project, Gloria Richards,
kept detailed records during the course of its operation, and at its
conclusion wrote an excellent report of the experiences of the experi-
ment. It is with specific reference to this report and its conclusions,
rather than as another example of a home ownership project, that the
Lincoln Estates demonstration will be considered here. 1
This is why Lincoln Estates will not be included with the
other projects in several of the discussions which follow, particularly
in the discussions in Chapter IV which concern the mechanical aspects
of conducting a home ownership program.
TABLE 12
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIVE HOME OWNERSHIP PROJECTS
1. Dates
2. Location
3. Funding
4. Financing
Interim
Mortgage
5. Type of House
BCIC
.1964
St. Louis,
Missouri
Donations
OEO grant
($101,830)
Local banks
a)Conventional,
100% at 6% in-
terest
b)221(h) since
fall, 1967
Brick single-
family and row
houses
BRL
1964
Rochester, New
York
Donations
Pool of local
banks
a)221(d)(2)
b)221(h)
All types of
single-family
houses; 4 2-fam-
ily houses
IICC
March 1967
Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania
EDA grant
($84,000)
Dept. of Labor
($30,000)
Commercial
loans
a)221(d)(2)
b)221(h)
Brick rowhouses
FHH
1950-1965
Indianapolis,
Indiana
Donations
LE
1963-1968
Gainesville,
Florida
Low-Income Hous-
Demonstration
grant ($104,880)
$200,000 donated Private
revolving fund
Conventional,
4Vo-54% in-
terest
New ranch-style
homes, frame or
stone
221(d) (2)
54l-5 3/4%
New single-
family homes
6. Price of Houses
Acquisition
cost
Rehabilitation
cost
Fee for Sponsor
$500-$2000
$5000-$6000 for
conventional
mortgages
$8000 for 221(h)
None
$7000-$8000
$looo-$4ooo
$650
o-$1600
$6300-$9500
None Yes, to cover
costs
Enough for de-
veloper to
earn a oro-
fit
TABLE 12, Continued
6. (Continued)
Total Price
Home Owner
7. Down Payment
8. Typical Monthly
Payment
9. Sweat Equity
10. Temporary
Rental
11. Geographical
Focus
12. Income of
Families
$6000-$7000 on
conventional mort-
gages
$9000-$9500 on
221(h)
None
$55-$72 on con-
ventional mort-
gages
$64 for 221(h)
None
One Year
Nine-block slum
area
$2500-$8000
$8000-$11000
None (Sweat
equity)
$94 on
221(d)(2)
$77.50 on
221(h)
To cover down
payment and
closing costs
8-12 months
while doing
sweat equity
Entire metro-
politan area
$3800-$7000
$8000411000
$200-$700, de-
pending on what
family can afford,
under 221(d)(2)
and 221(h)
$72 on 221(d)(2)
$54 on 221(h)
None
None
Several neigh-
borhoods of slum
area
$3000-$8000
$12i,500-$15,00 $9150-$13,200
None ($3,500-
$6000 worth of
Sweat equity)
$65
25%-39% of
value of house
None
Two cleared
sites on east
and west edges
of city
$300o-$6000
Minimum of
$200
$58-$80
None
None
A 250-home
subdivision
$3420-$8415
BCIC BRL IICC FHH LE
TABLE 12, Continued
BCIC
13. Color of Fami-
lies
14. Status as of
March, 1968
All Negro
75 homes finished
and occupied by
owners
15. Miscellaneous
BRL
50% Negro, 50%
white
221(d)(2)
36 owners in
finished
homes
6 families
ready to
take title
48 in rental
stage
30 under nego-
tiation
221(h)
8 commitments
received
Works through
local realtors
IICC
All Negro to date
12 owners in
finished homes
40 houses under
construction
Training program
for local labor
with contractors
FHH
All Negro
366 owners in
finished homes
No longer in
operation
Really a kind
of "self-help"
housing
LE
All Negro
50 owners in
finished homes
Demonstration
completed
A demonstration
rather than an
on-going project
CHAPTER III
WHY SHOULD HOME OWNERSHIP FOR LOW-INCOME PEOPLE BE ENCOURAGED?
One obvious response to the question posed by this chapter
would be that low-income people who-are not now able to own their own
homes would like to be able to do so. Is this true? Is there an un-
fulfilled desire for home ownership among low-income families? Al-
though a negative answer to this question would not necessarily mean
that the idea of a national home ownership program should be dropped,
it would certainly require that the justifications and rationale for
such a program be stronger than if the answer were positive. Therefore
the question of whether low-income people want to become home owners
will be discussed here before other justifications are taken up.
A. The Desire For Home Ownership
One way to find out whether people want to own their own homes
is to ask them. Many surveys have been done of the preference and rea-
sons for home ownership. In a study done by Architectural Forum in
1937, 1,003 interviews were conducted in eight cities of various sizes
and in various regions of the United States.1 It was found that 91% of
the present home owners wanted to continue to be home owners, and 32.7%
of the renters wished to change to ownership. The Bureau of Urban Re-
1 "The Urge to Own," Architectural Forum, LXVII, No. 5 (Novem-
ber, 1937), 370-378.
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search of Princeton University did a similar survey in 1942, with a sam-
ple taken over the entire country. The conclusion was that 86% of the
home owners in American cities were satisfied with ownership, and that
60% of the renters wanted to become owners. A study done by Theodore
Caplow of 574 families in Minneapolis in 1948 found that 73.4% of the
renters and 86.7% of the owners preferred owning to renting, and that
91% of the total sample felt that most families should own their own
homes. 2
These surveys are quite old, The one done in 1948 showed a high-
er preference for ownership than the one done in 1937, and a study con-
ducted in 1968 would probably reveal a still higher preference, In
addition, the surveys are not broken down by income levels, which makes
them inappropriate for answering our question about low-income people,
But even if a similar survey were done recently, and were categorized
according to income, it would be of limited value for several reasons.
In the first place, no alternative is proposed to ownership when
the interviewee is asked about his preference, and he is not asked how
much he would like ownership. The answer given is therefore chiefly of
academic value. A family might reply that of course it would like to
own a home, but it might also rather own a car or keep its money in a
bank than buy a house - in which case, the desire for home ownership
may never be translated into action. Or the family might want to own
1 Melville C. Branch, Jr., "Urban Planning and Public Opinion"
(Bureau of Urban Research, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey,
Sept. 1942).
2 "Home Ownership and Location Preference in a Minneapolis Sam-
ple," American Sociological Review, XIII (Dec., 1948), 725-730.
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its own house, but not enough to mow the grass and make the mortgage pay-
ments every month. Answering a survey is not the same as purchasing a
house.
In the second place, the expressed desire for ownership may ac-
tually be a manifestation of some other preference., To many families,
home ownership means a house with a lawn in the suburbs, whereas renting
means an apartment in the city. A vote for ownership in such a case may
really be a vote for a single-family home or for a suburban location. A
study done by John Lansing of the University of Michigan in 1963 and
1965 involving 1564 interviews in 32 metropolitan areas found that 83%
of the families surveyed wanted to live in single-family homes, and that
three times as many would prefer to move farther from the center of the
city as would prefer to move closer to it.1 These preferences may not
be properly separated out in a survey which simply asks whether the fam-
ily would like to own its own home.
Another way to answer the question of how many low-income famili.es
would like to be home owners is to assume that low--income families would
behave like middle-income families if they were financially able to do
so, and that middle-income families would exhibit the spending patterns
of upper-income families if they could. In this case, instead of the
47% of families with incomes below $6,000 in metropolitan areas who now
1 John B. Lansing and Eva Mueller, with Nancy Barth, "Residen-
tial Location and Urban Mobility" (Survey Research Center, Institute
for Social Research, The University of Michigan, June, 1964).
and
John B. Lansing, "Residential Location and Urban Mobility: The Second
Wave of Interviews" (Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Re-
search, The University of Michigan, January, 1966).
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own their own homes, 73% would be home owners, just as 73% of the metro-
politan families with incomes of $6,000 and above are presently home
owners. A calculation based on this assumption was done in an unpub-
lished study by the Philadelphia Housing Association.2 Only non-elderly
households with two or more persons in metropolitan areas were consi-
dered. The study concluded that 20% or 1,632,689 of such families with
incomes between $3,000 and $6,000 are now renters but would like to be-
come owners.
There is a danger involved in doing an analysis of this kind,
however, or in basing a national program on such a calculation. The per-
son doing the analysis may be accused of "imposing his middle-class
values on lower-income people." Low-income people may not want to be-
come middle-class, the argument goes. Any policy based on the assump-
tion that low-income people would spend or act like middle-income people
if they had enough money lays itself wide open to criticisms of planning
"for people" rather than "with people."
The safest and soundest way to find out whether low-income people
would like to be home owners is therefore not to take surveys, nor to
make calculations like the preceding one, but rather to examine the ex-
periences of the home ownership projects. The answer on these grounds
is a resounding "Yes." To be sure, the existing projects are on an ex-
tremely' small scale, of an entirely different magnitude from that which
1 See Table 6, p. 20.
2
Sue Moyerman, "Estimated Cost of the Proposed Low Income Mort-
gage Program" (Philadelphia Housing Association Finance Committee, Work-
ing Paper Number 2, May, 1966).
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a national program might achieve. But as far as they have gone, these
projects have met with an overwhelming enthusiasm for ownership and have
had many more applicants than they are able to handle, often without any
form of advertising or promotion. One problem with which these projects
have not had to contend is a lack of interest.
BCIC reports five applicants for every one place; BRL has "more
families applying than we know what to do with." Flanner House Homes
estimates that it had 1500 to 2000 applications for the 366 homes it was
able to provide. At IICC, the only form of publicity that has been
found necessary is a large red-and-white sign placed on each- of the
houses being rehabilitated, stating briefly that it is easy to become a
home owner and giving an address to contact. Word-of-mouth has been the
chief recruiter in all of the programs.
Of course, there is very little reason for families not to want
to become home owners under these programs. In most cases, they receive
better housing at the same prices they were paying to rent,1 and free
social services and counseling, as well as the deed to a house. Since a
national program would also provide all of these, however, these projects
are relevant prototypes. In addition, since the home ownership promoted
by these projects and under discussion here is the ownership of single-
family homes (or in a few cases two- or three-family structures) rather
than condominium or cooperative apartments, it is not necessary to sepa-
rate out the desire for ownership from the desire for a single-family
home. All that is necessary to know is that substantial numbers of low-
1 See the section on financial advantages to the home owner,
beginning on p. 59.
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income families do want to own the kinds of homes which would be offered
by the proposed home ownership programs.
We may not be able to say for certain that there are 1,632,689
or 1,000,000 or even 500,000 low-income metropolitan families who would
like to become home owners, nor can we be sure that the demand on a na-
tional scale would be as strong as it has been on the small scale. But
we can say with confidence, and on the basis of experience as well as
suggestive surveys and analyses, that there is an unmet demand for the
ownership of decent homes by low-income families, and that there is
therefore a role for a national ownership program to play in the housing
policy of the United States.
B. The Justification For Home Ownership
Given that there is a substantial, although perhaps indetermin-
able, unfulfilled desire for home ownership among low-income people,
the question still remains as to why the government is justified in tak-
ing a part in fulfilling this demand. After all, there is probably an
unmet desire for color television sets among low-income people, but no
one has proposed a national policy for encouraging color TV ownership.
What justification is there for a national home ownership policy?
The answer to this question must depend on the assumption that
a national housing policy can be justified. If one believes that the
federal government should do nothing to improve the housing situation
in the United States, then one cannot justify the government's partici-
pation in a home ownership program. Perhaps more can be accomplished,
even in the field of housing, by a system of negative income taxes or
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by a massive job-training and employment program than by a policy aimed
directly at housing.
This is an extremely important and problematic issue. Experts
cannot agree about it, and no study or analysis made at the present time
could provide a definitive answer, because there are so many unknowns
and unpredictable variables involved. It has been argued that the basis
of poverty is a lack of money, and that the best way to ameliorate it is
therefore to distribute money. Or it has been said that the best solu-
tion is job training, which will allow people to increase their own in-
comes, and to supply themselves with better housing or whatever else
they need and want. On the other hand, there are arguments that a system
vhich just redistributes money, like the negative income tax, will have
little effect on improving the supply of housing, and that few of the
dollars received by people living in substandard dwellings would be
spent on better housing. It is also claimed that housing affects other
factors such as health and general welfare, so that money spent directly
on housing measures will have a multiplier effect.
The question of the underlying justification for housing measures
is beyond the scope of this thesis. In keeping with the pragmatic tone
here, it is best to assume that the issue of justification has already
been resolved by politicians and public opinion. It cannot be said that
housing policies are more beneficial than, or should exclude, other wel-
fare measures. It can be said, however, even without the support of
politicians or public opinion, that housing measures with beneficial re-
sults are by definition beneficial, and are in this sense justified.
Assuming the validity of a federal housing program, why home
ownership? Home ownership ends the dependency of a tenant upon his
landlord, and provides an additional type of housing tenure. Home owner-
ship is being considered here not as an alternative to other housing pro-
grams, but rather as an addition to existing programs.. All of the gov-
ernment's housing programs for low- and moderate-income families have,
with the exception of the few recently-passed measures mentioned in
Chapter I, been concerned only with rental housing. A home ownership
program could serve different people with different desires in different
locations from those who wish to participate in the rental programs. In
other words, home ownership will diversify the choices open to low-income
people. The burden of proof thus rests upon showing that home ownership
is a housing measure which will produce beneficial results.'
It is hoped that home ownership can have three kinds of benefi-
cial results: (1) desirable effects on the home owner, (2) improvements
in physical housing condition, and (3) an upgrading of the general
quality of the neighborhood. The goals of both private home ownership
projects and public home ownership policies, whether explicit or impli-
cit, also fall into the same three categories. For example, FHA Com-
missioner P. N. Brownstein explained that the underlying aim of Section
221(h) is
to bring the elusive goal of home ownership within the grasp of
low-income families. This program makes it possible for quali-
fied sponsors to upgrade neighborhoods, to salvage basically
sound houses, and guide and counsel families of modest means
in achieving successful home ownership.2
The relationship of the costs of a home ownership program to
other housing programs will be discussed in Chapter IV.
2 HUD News Release, Feb. 6, 1968.
la. Effects On The Home Owner - Financial Advantages
The low-income family is expected to benefit from ownership in
both financial and less tangible ways. Two financial benefits can be
distinguished: (1) monthly mortgage payments are a form of forced sav-
ings, and result in a growing equity position; and (2) owning may be
cheaper than renting. The less tangible benefits include a sense of
dignity and pride in ownership, a feeling of belonging and security,
the motivation to work harder or to find a better job, and a closer
and more stable family life.
The first financial benefit is self-evident. Even with a 25-
year mortgage (at 6% interest), a home owner will have accumulated
10.1% of his mortgage as equity by the end of 5 years, and with a 3%
Section 221(h) loan the corresponding figure is 14.5%. With a 15-year
mortgage at 6 1/2% interest, 23.14% of the mortgage is paid off in 5
years. This kind of forced savings can be especially important to low-
income families, who normally save little or nothing. In addition to
being a resource for emergencies, the equity will provide the basis for
a sound credit rating which most low-income people lack, and will there-
by improve the family's ability to borrow when necessary or desirable.
The second financial benefit hinges upon the deceptively simple
issue of whether it is cheaper to own or to rent. Realtors have been
writing articles for years which "explain" why owning is cheaper, but
there is a conspicuous absence of an objective or scholarly study of
the subject. The reason for this absence is not difficult to under-
stand: there can be no answer to the question as stated. Whether owning
is cheaper than renting depends on many factors, such as the amount that
an owned home can be sold for in relation to the amount paid for it,
the particular real estate market and city one is talking about, the
tax and insurance structures for owner- and renter-occupied housing
in that particular city, the kinds of rental housing that are available,
the income level and family situation of the family in question and
similar other questions for which no general answer can be given.
Two kinds of problems are involved in comparing the costs of own-
ing and renting. The first is the difficulty of establishing the true
total cost of ownership; the second is the difficulty of finding equiva-
lent owned and rented dwelling units to be compared. A quick glance at
the Census data on housing expense shows that owners pay much more for
their housing than do renters, but the owners are of course securing a
much better level of housing. Most rented dwelling units are apartments,
in two- or multi-family structures, whereas most owner-occupied dwellings
are single-family homes with yards and separate access. Even if it were
possible to calculate exactly what it costs to own a given typical single-
family home in a typical suburb, it would be difficult to find enough
similar homes being rented on the open market to make a significant com-
parison.
- Most families have little idea of what the actual total cost of
owning their own home is. Although Alvin Hansen may regard the resident-
owner "as a small capitalist who leases the property to himself,"1 Alvin
Coons and Bert Glaze in a study of 100 home owners concluded that
owners are not investors in the classic sense.2 They found that the
1 Alvin H. Hansen, Business Cycles and National Income (New
York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1951), p. 109.
2 Alvin E. Coons and Bert T. Glaze, Housing Market Analysis and
the Growth of Nonfarm Home Ownership, Bureau of Business Research Mono-
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owners had no precise idea about the expected life of their investment,
did not keep informed about the general level of rents in order to
switch to renting if that became financially advantageous, often could
not enumerate even common operating costs, and in only 2 cases out of
100 mentioned the opportunity costs of ownership. Only the monthly
mortgage payments and the size of the down payment proved to be of major
concern.
Fred Case, in a survey of the costs of home maintenance, reached
a similar conclusion:
That the majority of home owners do not keep even the most
elementary expense records indicates definitely that they
do not treat home ownership as an investment problem. Their
greatest financial concern is with their ability to meet the
constantly recurring expenses of occupying the home. Home-
owners know less about the actual cost of owning a home than
about almost any other expenditure they make, yet housing
consumes more of a moderate-income budget than any other
single item except food.1
Gloria Richards found the same to be true of the low-income home
owners involved in the Lincoln Estates demonstration project:
Most of these families are not economically sophisticated
enough to comprehend the equity principal and their major
concern is how to make monthly payments....Protecting their
investment in a home is not the significant factor. Provid-
ing the home and making the mortgage payments is the deciding
factor in continuing with the mortgage transaction.2
(Footnote 2 continued from p. 60)
graph Number 115 (Columbus, Ohio: Bureau of Business Research College
of Commerce and Administration, The Ohio State University, 1963).
Fred E. Case, Cash Outlays and Economic Costs of Homeownership
(Los Angeles, The Real Estate Research Program, Bureau of Business and
Economic Research, University of California, 1957), p. 30.
2 Senate Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs, Hearings,
1967, p. 834.
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A large number of studies of the reasons for which people become
home owners have shown that noneconomic factors are more important than
financial considerations in the ownership decision.1 When families
purchase their homes for such noneconomic reasons as the desire for in-
dependence, security, or status, they become consumers rather than in-
vestors. As consumers, they are concerned with the required cash outlay
at the time of purchase and each month, rather than with the appreciation
in the value of the house or with the return foregone on the money in-
vested in the home.
The fact that noneconomic motivations may be more relevant than
economic considerations to the desire for ownership, and that most owners
have little idea of the true price they pay for owning, may mean that
ownership could be chosen or desired even if the economic factors proved
to be disadvantageous. It does not mean, however, that financial advan-
tages or disadvantages do not exist, nor that the policy-maker deciding
whether or not to advocate a home ownership program is excused from the
task of calculating benefits and costs. The financial considerations
are of great importance to present home owners whether they realize it
or not, and can only be of greater importance to potential low-income
owners. In other words, it must be kept in mind throughout the follow-
ing analysis that although most families never make similar calculations,
and even low-income owners may not be concerned with the true price they
are paying to own, the financial aspects of ownership are perhaps the
1 William L. Slayton and Richard Dewey, "Needs and Desires of
the Urbanite," The Future of Cities and Urban Development, ed, Coleman
Woodbury (Chicago: The University'of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 322..
most crucial issue for the policy-maker.
The most difficult to determine, and yet often most important,
component of the total cost of ownership is the loss or gain from the
sale of the house at the end of occupancy. If a house is bought for
$15,000 and sold for $40,000 ten years later, the capital gain may out-
weigh all the other costs of ownership combined. On the other hand, a
house bought for $40,000 and sold for $15,000 will cost far more than
annual housing expenses would suggest. In this respect even the most
sophisticated purchaser must buy a home in partial blindness, for the
real estate market conditions which will prevail at the time of sale
can never be predicted with certainty at the time of purchase, For the
past 35 years real estate values have in general been rising, but this
is no guarantee that they will continue to do so.
Once a house has been sold, of course, the capital gain or loss
can be included in the total cost of ownership with 20/20 hindsight. An
owner who sold his house at a price in excess of the purchase price
would amortize this gain equally over the period of ownership, and de-
duct it from his annual costs. Similarly, an owner who sold below his
purchase price can include the amortized loss as one of his annual ex-
penses.
Apart from the question of capital gains or losses, there is
still no agreement even among the experts as to how the total costs of
ownership should be calculated. This disagreement reflects the division
of opinion about whether the home should be treated as an investment or
as a consumption good. Home owners tend to regard their house largely
as a consumption item, whereas economists often prefer to evaluate it
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as a form of investment. The method of accounting employed here will
be a combination of the two points of view. It is based upon the fact
that purchasers are more interested in living in their homes than in
making a profit from them, but it also regards the original down pay-
ment as an investment. The system. seems to be the most practical and
fruitful way of estimating the true costs of ownership for our purposes.
The first item included in total annual costs according to this
method is the monthly mortgage payment, which covers principal, in-
terest, taxes and special assessments, and property insurance. This is
the payment which home owners commonly regard as the total cost of own-
ership. Of the total monthly payment, principal and interest might
comprise from 70% to 90%, depending on the insurance and tax structure
in that locale.
The second item is the annual cost of maintenance and repairs.
These costs are harder to establish than they would seem to be, for few
owners keep accurate records of the amount they spend on maintenance
and repairs. A study done by Fred Case found these costs to be between
1% and 2% of the total value of the house.1 This is a convenient rule
of thumb, but the actual expense may vary widely depending on such
factors as the age of the house, its location, and the handiness of the
owner.
A third item to be included is the closing costs which an owner
must pay when purchasing a house. These costs include legal and survey-
ing fees, bank service charges, advance real estate taxes and insurance,
1 Case, p. 8.
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etc., and usually amount to between 2% and 4% of the purchase price of
1
the house, although they may go higher. Since closing costs are a
single rather than a recurring expense, they must be amortized over the
period of ownership.
Utilities are not included because they must be paid for whether
one owns or rents the house. (In anartments where the tenant does not
pay for utilities, the landlord has included them in the rent.) But
there is one more expense to be included - an interest charge on the
original amount of the down payment. The money used for the down pay-
ment often represents all or most of a family's savings.. If it were
used for an alternative investment like stocks or a bank account, it
would be earning a return in the form of interest, dividends, or capi-
tal appreciation. A figure representing this income foregone or "oppor-
tunity cost" must therefore be included in the total cost of ownership.
There is also an item which can be subtracted from total housing
expense when one is an owner rather than a renter. This is the savings
on income taxes which the owher makes by virtue of being allowed to
deduct interest payments on his mortgage and real estate taxes from tax-
able income. In addition, if the down payment money had instead been
invested in stocks or a bank account, the owner would have to pay taxes
on whatever return he earned. The advantages of deducting interest and
taxes from taxable income accrue to the owner only to the extent that,
when added to other allowable deductions, they exceed the automatic 10%
deduction available to all taxpayers. The savings which results will
Glenn H. Beyer, Housing and SocietyF (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1965), p. 253.
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vary with the owner's income level, for the higher his income the higher
the tax bracket and therefore the greater the savings.
The calculation of what the rent on a similar house would be
is quite simple in theory. One need only to go out and find comparable
houses for rent, and take the average of the rents being charged. As
noted earlier, however, such a comparison is not at all simple in prac-
tice; it may be quite difficult to find similar houses being rented. A
more practical way to compare the costs of owning and renting is there-
fore to calculate the true cost of ownership on a given house, and then
to see what kind of housing can be rented for the same price..
Let us take an example to demonstrate how this comparison could
be made. On a $25,000 house with a $5,000 down payment, financed with
a 25-year 6 1/2% mortgage, the total annual cost might be:
Annual Mortgage Payment $2163
(Principal + interest + insurance + taxes)
(Principal + interest = $1622
or 75% of total payment)
Maintenance and Repairs 375
(1.5% of value of house)
Closing Costs
($500 for a 25-year ownership
period or $500 + 25)
Interest Charge On Down 250
Payment ($5000 x 5%) $2808
Minus Income Tax Savings -260
(Average of $650 interest +
$400 taxes + $250 return on
down payment, all x 20%)
Total Annual Cost $2548
The equivalent monthly expense would be $212.33. If comparable housing
can be rented for less than $212.33 per month, then renting is cheaper
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for this particular family in this particular city; if not, owning is
cheaper.
This method assumes that the resale value of the house is zero.
If, instead, after 25 years the house could be sold for the same $25,000
for which it was purchased, (which assumes that rising real estate values
exactly make up for deterioration and obsolescence), then the annual cost
should be reduced by $25,000 + 25, or $1000. The true monthly housing
cost then becomes $129.
When a house is lived in after the mortgage has been completely
amortized, then annual costs are reduced by the amount of the mortgage
payments and closing costs, minus the tax savings on interest. This
would bring the monthly cost for this example in the 26th year to $86.33.
This method does not include the opportunity cost of the money invested
in the house, as would a pure investment model.1
A similar calculation was made for the typical total cost of own-
ership in each of the five home ownership projects studied here,2 These
The following calculation treats housing purely as an investment
good:
Insurance
plus Property taxes and special assessments
plus Maintenance and repairs
plus Depreciation (nonrecoverable loss in the value of the property
due to deterioration and obsolescence)
plus Interest and investment return (the current net earning power
of money invested in the home, whether this rate is being
paid as interest on a mortgage, or is a return foregone on
the down payment and other funds tied up in the house)
minus Income Tax Savings
Like the method discussed in the text, this calculation does not re-
flect capital gains or losses.
2 See Table 13, pp. 71-73.
calculations deal in averages and estimates and are therefore quite
rough, but they do suggest the magnitudes involved. Maintenance and
repairs were figured as 1.5% of the total value of the house; closing
costs were amortized over an arbitrarily-chosen period of 20 years; the
return which could be earned by investing the down payment elsewhere was
conservatively estimated at 5%; and the tax bracket used to calculate
tax savings was 16%, which is the bracket for a family earning $5000
with 2 or 3 children, or earning $6000 with 3 to 5 children.
The total monthly expense was based on the assumption of a resale
value of zero at the end of the life of the mortgage. In addition, a
calculation was made which assumed that the house could be resold for
its full purchase price at the end of the term of the mortgage. This
time period was chosen for the sake of simplicity, and may introduce a
measure of incomparability, since some of the mortgages are for 20 years
and others for 40 years. Only when the actual price and time of resale
are known can a truly accurate calculation of the cost of ownership be
made.
The total monthly housing expense (with zero resale value) among
the five projects ranges from $65 under IICC's 221(h) program to $98.50
with BRL's 221(d)(2) mortgages. How does this compare with the cost of
renting? The home owners at BCIC were previously paying $45 to $90 per
month as renters, often for substandard and overcrowded quarters or for
public housing. Home ownership under Section 221(h) now costs them $74
per month. At Better Rochester Living, the average previous rent was
$25 per week or $100 a month, in many cases for drafty deteriorating
apartments which -ran up extremely high heating bills. The average BRL
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ownership cost, by contrast, is $84 to $98.50. The IICC families paid
between $15 and $20 per week or $60 to $80 a month to rent dwelling
units usually unfit for human habitation, while they now pay $65 a
month under Section 221(h) to become the owners of spacious and attrac-
tive homes.
Gloria Richards reports that the Lincoln Estates home owners were
living formerly in substandard housing, often without plumbing, paved
streets, or city water and sewers. The rent was generally collected
weekly, and some of the landlords charged an extra fifty cents for each
day a rental payment was late, keeping padlocks on the door to lock a
tenant out if he was two or three days delinquent with the rent. Some
of the Lincoln Estates families lived in World War II surplus one-room
buildings approximately 400 square feet in size, for which they paid
$6 a week, or more than 1/3 of what they now pay to become the owners
of 2- to 4-bedroom houses.
In other words, although it may be impossible to give a general
or theoretical answer to the question of whether owning is cheaper than
renting, it is possible to give a specific answer with respect to the
five home ownership projects studied here. In most cases, the families
are paying no more to own than they did to rent, and in several cases
they are actually paying less, while the housing they are buying is
greatly superior to the units they rented. Of course, the low price at
which they are becoming home owners is due to some rather unusual cir-
cumstances: in many cases they have 100% mortgages at 3% interest
rates; in several of the projects they were allowed to substitute their
own labor for a cash down payment; and the "developer" or sponsor sell-
70
ing to them makes no profit. In most of the programs, the sponsor is
in fact losing money to the extent of administrative and overhead ex-
penses. Thus the experience of these five groups cannot be extrapolated
to say that owning is cheaper than renting in general. It can be inter-
preted as proof, however, that with the assistance of a national home
ownership program, low-income families can become the owners of decent
homes at the same or lower prices that they now pay to rent substandard,
overcrowded dwelling units.
lb. Effects On the Home Owner - Financial Disadvantages
Home ownership also involves several economic disadvantages which
should be mentioned here. These include (1) the danger of a sharp drop
in the real estate market or decline in the neighborhood at a time when
the owner wishes to sell his house; (2) the fact that the owner is re-
sponsible for all repairs and maintenance, expected or unexpected, inex-
pensive or costly; (3) the lack of mobility to change locations easily
and quickly in order to take advantage of better employment opportunities
or economic conditions; and (4) the possibility of foreclosure which the
owner faces if the mortgage payments are not made on time every month.
All home owners share these disadvantages, but low-income owners
may be particularly vulnerable to them. The list points up the neces-
sity for making the purchase decision carefully and for being aware of
all of the responsibilities which ownership entails. More will be said
about some of these risks and about avoiding them in Chapter IV, in
connection with the selection of potentially successful owners, the lo-
cation and kind of houses which low-income families should be encouraged
to buy, and the role of the sponsor organization in a home ownership
program.
TABLE 13
TYPICAL TOTAL COST OF OWNERSHIP FOR THE FIVE HOME OWNERSHIP PROJECTS
Total Monthly
Housing Expense
Total Monthly Housing
Expense, With House Sold
For Full Purchase Price at
End of Mortgage Term
Better Rochester Living
(20 year mortgages)
(Value of house = $10,000)
Monthly Payment (Principal, interest, insurance, + taxes)
Maintenance
Closing Costs
Interest on Down Payment
Minus Tax Savings
[($25 interest + $22 taxes) x 16% on 221(d)(2)]
[($12.50 interest + $22 taxes) x 16% on 221(h)]
Total
BCIC
(20 year mortgages)
(Value of house - $6,500 under conventional
mortgage, $9,500 under 221(h)
221(d) (2)
$94.00
12.00
221(h)
$77.50
12.00
None (Sweat Equity)
None (Sweat Equity)
7.50
$98.50
5.50
$84.oo
Monthly Payment (Principal, interest, insurance, + taxes)
Maintenance
Closing Costs ($200 for 20 yrs.)
Interest on Down Payment
Minus Tax Savings
[($16.25 interest + $4 taxes) x 16% on conventional]
[($12.00 interest + $6 taxes) x 16% on 221(h)]
Total
Conventional 221(h)
$6o.oo $64.oo
8.00
Conventional 221(h)
12.00
1.00 1.00
None (100% financing)
3.00 3.00
$66.oo
221(d)(2) 221(h)
$57.00 $42.50
$39.00 $34.50
TABLE 13, Continued
Total Monthly
Housing Expense
IICC
(30 year mortgages)
(Value of house = $10,000)
221(d)(2)
Monthly payment (Principal, interest, insurance, + taxes)
Maintenance
Closing Costs ($200 for 20 yrs.)
Interest on Down Payment
($400 x 5%)
Minus Tax Savings
[($25 interest + $10 taxes + $2 return) x 16% on 221(d)(2)]
[($12.50 interest + $10 taxes + $2 return) x 16% on 221(h)]
Total
Flanner House Homes
(20 year mortgage)
(Value of home = $13,000)
Monthly Payment (Principal, interest, insurance, + taxes)
Maintenance
Closing Costs ($200 for 20 yrs.)
Interest on Down Payment
Minus Tax Savings
[($19 interest + $5 tax) x 16%]
Total
$72.00
12.00
1.00
2.00
6.00
$81.00
221(h)
$54.00
12.00
1.00
2.00
4.00
$65.00
Total Monthly Housing
Expense, With House Sold
For Full Purchase Price at
End of Mortgage Term
221(d)(2) 221(h)
$53.00 $37.00
$65.00
16.00
1.00
None (Sweat Equity)
4.00
. $78.00 $24.00
TABLE 13, Continued
Total Monthly Housing
Expense, With House Sold
Total Monthly For Full Purchase Price at
Housing Expense End of Mortgage Term
Lincoln Estates
(40 year mortgage)
(Value of house = $12,000)
Monthly payment (Principal, interest, insurance, + taxes) $70.00
Maintenance 15.00
Closing Costs ($200 for 20 yrs.) 1.00
Interest on Down Payment 1.00
($200 x 5%)
Minus Tax Savings 5.00
[($28.75 interest + $3 tax + $1 return) x 16%]
Florida Homestead Exemption - $150/yr. 12.50
Total $69.50 $44.50
1c. Effects On the Home Owner -- Intangible Benefits
It is much more difficult to measure or document the less tangi-
ble effects of ownership on the home owner than it is to calculate the
financial advantages. Although statements testifying to the wonderful
effects which ownership can have, like Herbert Hooverts introduction to
How to Own Your Home, are found in.almost every discussion of home own-
ership, there has been no really objective research into the matter. Un-
like a study comparing the costs of owning and renting, an investigation
of the social and psychological effects of ownership is not inherently
impossible. Characteristics of people before and after they become home
owners could be analyzed, or groups of renters could be matched and com-
pared with groups of owners, or the effects of moving from an owned home
to a rented home could be studied. It would be difficult to separate out
the forces at work and to control for the numerous and interrelated varia-
bles involved, but such a study could be done. In the absence of such
research, let us examine the experiences of the five ownership groups
for whatever evidence is available.
1 "A family that owns its home takes a pride in it, maintains
it better, gets more pleasure out of it, and has a more wholesome,
healthful, and happy atmosphere in which t6 bring up children, The
home owner has a constructive aim in life. He works harder outside
his home; he spends his leisure more profitably; and he and his
family live a finer life and enjoy more of the comforts and cultivat-
ing influences of our modern civilization. A husband and wife who
own their home- are more apt to save. They have an interest in the ad-
vancement of a social system that permits the individual to store up
the fruits of his labor. As direct taxpayers they take a more active
part in local government. Above all, the love of home is one of the
finest instincts and the greatest inspirations of our people." (J.M.
Gries and J.S. Taylor, How to Own Your Home [Washington, Department
of Commerce, 1931], p. 1).
Better Rochester Living estimates that 75% of its home owners
have gotten better jobs or increased their incomes since BEL started
working with them. Cases of particular families are cited as examples
of the effect which ownership has had. In one family, according to the
director of BRL, two high school dropouts went back to school when
their parents became home owners, because the children then had for
the first time a room in which to study and the incentive to do so. In
another family, a man who had an income of $100 a month and credit ob-
ligations of $200 a month brought his credit payments down to one-half
of one week's salary in order to qualify for ownership. IICC claims
that many families are willing to legalize their marital status so that
they can become owners, and cites the case of a man who stopped drink-
ing in order to collect his down payment money.,
Lincoln Estates believes that a strengthening of family life
has occurred when the families purchased and occupied their own homes.
Signs of neighborliness and the willingness to help one another slowly
emerged, according to the demonstration report, and membership in the
neighborhood associations and city affairs increased. Twenty-two of
the fifty demonstration families found better employment.
However, each of the five ownership projects provided improved
housing, budget, credit, and employment counseling, and a general
"helping hand," as well as the chance to become a home owner. Although
it seems likely that at least some of the beneficial effects have been
the result of the family's new position as a home owner, it is diffi-
cult to prove conclusively that ownership by itself has been the cause
of any improvements. Perhaps decent housing or intensive counseling
and care would have produced the same motivational effects. Most of
the reported results are in the form of anecdotes; none has included a
comparison with a control group moving into a rented rehabilitated
house and given the same guidance.
About the only statement which can be made with impunity about
the intangible effects of ownership on the home owner is that the
claims made for it have far outdistanced its proven effects. Despite
the fact that these claims have not been well-supported, they are re-
peated frequently, even as the basis for national legislation, Senator
Percy, for instance, supported his ownership bill by saying:
Among the poor there are many who have the innate willingness
to strive and the capacity to achieve, provided this motiva-
tion barrier can be overcome. This can be achieved by more
ways than one. But one way is to show a low motivation family
the realistic prospect of becoming the owner of a decent home
or apartment of his own. In actual experience, families have
achieved remarkable feats of completing their basic education,
of straightening out credit records, of taking training for
better paying jobs, of budgeting the family income, and even
of changing their life style - merely because of the influence
of home ownership or its realistic possibility.1
As noted before, even HUD Secretary Weaver, so recently a foe of a low-
income home ownership program, supported the Administration's proposal
this year in terms of its ability to create a "sense of place and pur-
pose," "a pride of possession,"i and "responsibility and stability."2
It might be well at this point to recall the experience of an-
other housing measure which was ushered in with high expectations and
1 Senate Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs, Hearings,
1967, p. 1519.
2 Statement before the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs,
March 5, 1968, p.. 6.
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far-reaching goals. In the 1930's, public housing was established with
the hope that by improving the physical condition of a family's housing,
one would also improve the family's social and psychological welfare.
It was known that poor housing correlated with poor achievement records
and-high rates of juvenile delinquency; it was therefore expected that
better housing would produce. better achievement records and lower delin-
quency rates. To the disappointment of many well-intentioned people,
it was learned that a mere change in physical housing condition cannot
by itself produce changes :in deep-rooted social and psychological factors.
Today, we know that home owners have better jobs and higher in-
comes than renters, receive more education, and are more responsible
members of their communities. It is now being hypothesized and claimed
that by making more people home owners, we will raise incomes and employ-
ment levels and~educational attainments. Instead of a change in housing
condition, it is a change in tenure which is expected to affect motiva-
tions and attitudes.
Perhaps home ownership can inspire people to work harder and
stop drinking. But rather than once again asking too much of a single
welfare measure and then being faced with the disappointment which in-
evitably follows overly-high expectations, we should keep the goals and
anticipations for a home ownership program within relevant and realistic
bounds. Certainly no one has proven that a home ownership program will
have a substantial effect on reducing riots; to expect it to do so is
to doom the program to failure. If a national ownership program can
help thousands of low-income families to obtain better housing at the
same or lower prices they are now paying for substandard slum dwellings,
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and can at the same time improve the condition of the nation's housing
stock, it will have more than proved its value. Any other benefits
which arise should be regarded as gratuitous.
2. The Effects On the Physical Condition of Housing
It is far easier to prove a !relationship between home ownership
and good housing condition than it is to document the effect of owner-
ship on the lives of the owner-family or on the general quality of the
neighborhood. In 1960, 88% of the owner-occupied dwelling units in the
country were in sound condition and 2,5% were classified as dilapidated;
of the rented units only 74% were sound and 7% were dilapidated. The
1
same pattern held true inside metropolitan areas.
Looking at the situation the other way around, 55% of the units
classified as deteriorating and 64% of the units classified as dilapi-
dated in 1960 were rented, although rental units made up only 38% of
the total housing stock. Within metropolitan areas, where 41% of the
housing was renter-occupied, 64% of the deteriorating units and 71% of
the dilapidated units were rented.2 Clearly, the substandard "housing
problem" in the United States is primarily a matter of rental housing..
Owner-occupants spend more money to maintain the homes they own
than do absentee-landlords. William Grigsby estimates that in 1960
the average expenditure for upkeep, repair and rehabilitation per dwell-
ing unit was about $370 for owner-occupied single-family homes, but
1 See Table 14, p. 84.
See Table 15, p. 85.
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only $150 for rental units. About two-thirds of this amount, Grigsby
feels, is explained by the larger size and value of single-family homes,
but the residual amount he attributes to owner-occupancy itself. The
owner--occupant is a consumer as well as an investor, whereas the
absentee-owner is purely an investor, and this difference is reflected
directly in levels of housing maintenance.
The fact that owner-occupied housing is in better physical con-
dition than renter-occupied housing cannot be accounted for entirely by
the higher income levels of owners. Even within the same income cate-
gory, resident-owners live in better housing than do renters, At each
income level, there is at least twice as much dilapidated housing and
substantially more deteriorating housing among rented than among owner-
occupied units.
An objection which may be raised to a gross analysis like this
is that the owned and rented dwellings in the Census data, even when
broken down by the resident's income, are not necessarily comparable.
Owned dwellings are usually single-family homes, and are found more often
in suburban areas than are multi-family rental units. It is arguable
that the difference in physical condition is due to the single-family-
ness or to the influence of suburbia rather than to ownership itself.
George Sternlieb of Rutgers University did a housing study which
overcomes this- objection. The study was based on a structured random
1 William G. Grigsby, Housing Markets and Public Policy (Phila-
delphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), p. 236.
2 See Table 16, p. 86,
George Sternlieb, The Tenement Landlord (New Brunswick, New
Jersey: Rutgers-The State University, 1966).
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sample of 566 slum tenements (each with three or more apartments) in 39
census tracts of the city of Newark, New Jersey. The census tracts were
divided into five groups according to the color of the residents and
the percentage of sound dwelling units within each tract.. Thirty-seven
percent of the tenements were resident-owned and 63% were owned by
absentee-landlords.
Sternlieb found that even within these homogeneous groups, all
containing multi-family center-city tenements, "resident ownership is
the keystone of good maintentance." Twenty-two percent of the absentee-
owned properties were "poorly kept" and 13% "well kept," whereas of the
resident-owned tenements only 8.6% were "poorly kept" and 38% were "well
kept."1 Only resident-owners, concluded Sternlieb, provide the degree
of close supervision needed to keep slum properties in good condition,
In his own words,
What we have here is nothing very profound. I am afraid most
college research is devoted toward describing what is obvious
from commonsense. The man who lives in his own home takes
care of it. 2
As Sternlieb notes, the conclusions reached by his study and de-
rived from Census data are backed up by common sense and popular opinion,
These opinions, usually based on first-hand experience, can be found
throughout the pages of the 1967 Senate Housing Committee Hearings,
testifying to the relationship between ownership and good housing con-
dition. For example, Charles Abrams stated that:
1 See Table 17, p. 87.
2 Senate Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs, Hearings,
1967, p. 222.
On a tour through the Negro areas of Philadelphia, Brooklyn,
or Chicago, one can quickly identify by their good appearance
and upkeep the houses which are owned by low-income Negro
families and those which are being rented to them by specula-
tors. The freshly-painted fronts and the flower-boxes are
among the signs by which ownership can be identified.
1
And Senator Charles Percy told of an experience of his:
I went down one street of Bedford-Stuyvesant Sunday afternoon,
littered with junk and garbage and paper. And I walked around
the block and came back another street with no garbage and no
litter, but neat, attractive areas. And I asked "Whatts the
difference?"
And they showed me a chart indicating that the first
- street was entirely rental, and the other street had 70%
ownership. 2
All of these kinds of evidence, however - Census data, Stern-
lieb's study, general impressions - prove a correlation rather than a
causal relationship between ownership and good housing condition. Per-
haps the causal relationship works in the other direction; perhaps fam-
ilies who want to live in good housing become home owners so that they
will be able to maintain their homes as they wish. Or perhaps all of
the families who would make successful home owners and keep their homes
in good condition have already purchased homes. But what we are in-
terested in here is whether home ownership can cause people to take
better care of their homes, and whether families who are now renters
will improve their standards of maintenance when they become home owners.
1 Ibid., p. 714.
2 Ibid., p. 201.
These statements may seem exaggerated, and did seem so to me,
until I took a tour of a slum area in Philadelphia and spotted three
shiny, well-cared-for row houses in the midst of decaying dwellings.
These three of course turned out to be owner-occupied, while the rest
on the block were owned by absentee-landlords. I suppose that the
reader will remain skeptical until he too has had a similar experi-
ence.
If this does not happen, then low-income families who are encouraged
by a national program to become home owners may let their new homes de-
teriorate to the condition of the units they previously rented.
Public housing advocates knew that poor housing correlated with
high crime rates and hoped that an improvement in housing condition
would lead to a reduction in crime. Today, we know that home ownership
correlates with good housing condition. Will an increase in low-income
owner-occupancy result in better housing conditions, or will the experi-
ence be analogous to that of public housing?
The only way to answer this question conclusively is to look at
the way in which low-income families who have recently become home
owners are caring for their homes. Almost all of the families involved
in the five ownership projects studied here came from substandard
rental dwellings. What has been the projects' experience with respect
to the maintenance standards of these same families when they become
owners?
Every one of the projects has found that the owners consistently
keep their homes in surprisingly good physical condition. Each of the
projects reports one or two families who have allowed their homes to
deteriorate since moving in, but these are by far the exception rather
than the rule. In most cases, the families have been prompted to im-
prove as well as to maintain their homes. The families apparently do
feel that the homes are theirs, and this does seem to make a difference
in maintenance levels. The owners do not face the apathy of the land-
lord when repairs are needed; they feel a pride and responsibility in
ownership; they often clean the streets and sidewalks in front of
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their houses as well as their own yards and homes. The effect on physi-
cal housing condition has been the most noticeable and clear-cut result
of the efforts of all of the five groups, and the way in which the home
owners care for their homes was cited by each as the most tangible and
telling symbol of the project's success.
3. Effects On the Neighborhood
The effect which home ownership can be said to have on the gen-
eral quality of a neighborhood depends on how this "general quality" is
defined. Several measures of neighborhood quality such as stability or
community organization are relatively easy to document. Other variables
like attitudes toward the neighborhood or cohesiveness are theoretically
possible but more difficult to study, and no one seems to have done so.
Once again, in the absence of adequate and comprehensive research, the
discussion here will present whatever documented material is available
and then will cite the evidence gathered from the five ownership
projects.
Neighborhoods of home owners are more stable than neighborhoods
of renters. During the two-year period from 1958 to 1959, for example,
approximately one out of every four families in the United States moved.
Of the movers, more than 75% were renters, despite the fact that renters
made up only 38% of the total number of families in 1960.1
Owners thus live in one house for a longer period of time than
1 U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census of Housing, 1960, Vol.
IV, Components of Inventory Change - Inventory Characteristics, Part
lB, 1962, pp. 16-17.
TABLE 14
TENURE BY HOUSING CONDITION, 1960
Owner-Occupied
Dwelling Units
Renter-Occupied
Dwelling Units
Total U.S.
Sound
Deteriorating
Dilapidated
Inside SMSA's
Sound
Deteriorating
Dilapidated
88.0%
9.5-
2.5
100.0%
92.4%
6.2
1.4
100.0%
73,9%
19.0
7.1
100.0%
79.,%
15.9
5.0
100.0%
Source: Derived from U.S. Census of Housing: 1960, Volume II,
Part 1, pp. 1-6 and 1-20.
TABLE 15
HOUSING CONDITION BY TENURE, 1960
Total Sound Deteriorating Dilapidated
Total U.S.
Owner-Occupied
Renter-Occupied
Inside SMSA's
Owner-Occupied
Renter-Occupied
61.9% 65.9%
38.1 34.1
100.0% 100.0%
58.9%
41.1
62.6%
37.4
100.0% 100.0%
Source: Derived from U.S. Census of Housing, 1960, Volume II, Part 1,
pp. 1-6 and 1-20.
44.7%
55.3
100.0%
35.8%
64.2
100.0%
36.4%
63.6
100,0%
29.3%
70.7
l00,0%
TABLE 16
HOUSING CONDITION BY INCOME AND TENURE, 1960
Income In 1959 of Inhabitant Sound Deteriorating Dilapidated
Less than $2,000
Owner-Occupied 72.0% 20.3% 7.7%
Renter-Occupied 58.2 27.0 14.8
$2,000-2,999
Owner-Occupied 79.5 15.9 4.6
Renter-Occupied 66.4 24.0 9,6
$3,000-3,999
Owner-Occupied 83.0 13.6 3.4
Renter-Occupied 72.5 20.9 6.6
$4,000-4,999
Owner-Occupied 86.6 11.0 2.4
Renter-Occupied 77.2 18.1 4.7
$5,000-5,999
Owner-Occupied 90.2 8.2 1.6
Renter-Occupied 80.8 15.7 3.5
$6,ooo-6,999
Owner-Occupied 92.7 6.3 1.0
Renter-Occupied 83.9 13.3 2.8
$T,000-7,999
Owner-Occupied 94.1 5.1 0.8
Renter-Occupied 86.0 11.7 2.3
$8,000-9,999
Owner-Occupied 95.2 4.2 o.6
Renter-Occupied 88.1 10.0 1.9
$10,ooo-14,999
Owner-Occupied 96.4 3.2 o.4
Renter-Occupied 90.6 7.9 1.5
$15,000 or more
Owner-Occupied 98.1 1.7 0.2
Renter-Occupied 94.4 4.7 0.9
Note: Rows add across to 100%.
Source: Derived from U.S. Census of Housing: 1960, Volume II, Part 1,
p. 1-6.
TABLE 17
PROPERTY MAINTENANCE - STERNLIEB STUDY
Well Kept Reasonably Poorly
Kept Kept
Area 1
Resident Owned 35.5% 51.6% 12,9%
Absentee Owned 10.3 62.6 27.1
Area 2A
Resident Owned 34.4 59.3 6-3
Absentee Owned 12.5 61.5 26.0
Area 2B
Resident Owned 45.0 55.0 0,0
Absentee Owned 14.7 73.5 11.8
Area 3A
Resident Owned 32.1 53.6 14.3
Absentee Owned 9.2 73.6 17.2
Area 3B
Resident Owned 46.4 46.4 7,2
Absentee Owned 25.5 54.5 20.2
Total
Resident Owned 38.1 53.3 8.6
Absentee Owned 12.9 64.4 22.7
Note: Rows add across to 100.0%.
Source: Derived from George Sternlieb, The Tenement Landlord, Exhibits
9-1 and 9-3, pp. 175 and 177.
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do renters, which enables them to become better acquainted with their
neighbors and to form stronger ties with their community. Because an
owner remains in one place longer, and because he has a financial as
well as a social investment in the area, it is in his self-interest to
see that the neighborhood is well-maintained or improved. It is there-
fore not surprising to find that resident-owners participate much more
actively than renters in community affairs, and that owner-occupied
areas have stronger neighborhood organizations than do rental areas.
The University of Maryland did a series of studies of citizen
participation in the block clubs of an area of Baltimore known as Harlem
Park:
Perhaps the most startling fact revealed by these studies is
that one can simply divide the population in terms of those
who own property. Those who own property can be attracted
and can participate and are willing to give of themselves to
work in the neighborhood. Those who rent, those who do not
feel they are part of the neighborhood, stay away. 1
Resident-owners are also much more willing to cooperate in
neighborhood rehabilitation efforts than are tenants. An article by
Sogg and Wertheimer which investigated this subject concluded that:
It is generally acknowledged that the success of a conserva-
tion program depends largely on the co-operation and assist-
ance of the area's owners and residents. A greater degree of
co-operation can be expected from an owner who resides in the
area than from those absentee owners who regard the property
simply as a wasting asset to be exploited for maximum revenues
with minimum outlay for maintenance.2
1 Senate Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs, Hearings,
1967, p. 813.
2 Wilton S. Sogg and Warren Wertheimer, "Legal and Governmental
Issues In Urban Renewal," Urban Renewal: The Record and the Contro-
versy, ed, James Q. Wilson (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T.
Press, 1966), p. 172.
Other reports documenting the greater participation of owners in com-
munity affairs and their greater interest in improving the neighbor-
hood are numerous.
George Sternlieb in his study of 566 Newark tenements found that
one of the basic problems of slum neighborhoods, the alienation or an-
tagonism between landlords and tenants, is largely a function of
absentee-landlordism. The tenement owners were asked to list the fol-
lowing six factors in the order of their importance as problems in
maintaining and improving their property: tenants, mortgaging costs,
mortgaging length, tax level, tax reassessment, and builder require-
ments. The large property owners who managed their houses as absentee-
landlords felt that tenants were by far their number one problem. The
resident-owners, on the other hand, found tenants to be much less of a
problem, relating to them personally and in Sternlieb's words acting
"as guides and creators of life patterns for the youth of the slums to
follow."1 Thus Sternlieb concluded that a high degree of resident-
ownership was extremely beneficial to a slum neighborhood, and he advo-
cated a program to encourage ownership as a means of upgrading our slums.
The five home ownership projects have found that the effect of
ownership on the general quality of the neighborhood has been much less
obvious than its effect on the individual owners or on the physical
condition of the housing. For example, BCIC has noticed a definite im-
provement in the appearance of its 9-block area, but this improvement
is probably almost entirely a reflection of the refurbished and improved
physical condition of the 75 owner-occupied homes. Few of the absentee-
1 Sternlieb, p. 228.
landlords have been inspired to fix up their houses. And as far as
crime rates or the general image of the neighborhood are concerned, BCIC
feels that not enough of the homes have yet been converted to ownership
to have an influence on such factors.
BCIC tried to organize a neighborhood association in its nine
blocks, but the association never really became strong enough to sur-
vive, and the attempt was postponed. When more of the homes are owner-
occupied, BCIC will try again. As one of the directors of the program
perceptively commented, "We were trying to do things backwards. We
wanted to have a community organization before we had a community."1
There have been a few positive effects on the BCIC neighborhood.
The project suffered from vandalism during the rehabilitation of every
one of its first seventy houses. For about the last five houses, what-
ever the reason, no vandalism has occurred. BCIC hopes that the resi-
dents are beginning to realize that this project has been undertaken in
order to help them, and that they are therefore taking a neighborhood
interest in protecting it.
Better Rochester Living has found that other properties in the
neighborhoods it has entered have been improved in response to BRL's ef-
forts. When BRL paints a house and cleans up the yard, the neighbors
are prompted by the example to do likewise. Almost all of these neigh-
bors have been resident-owners, however; few of the absentee-landlords
have responded. Thus it may be that a home ownership project can produce
greater side effects in a neigliborhood in which there are already resi-
dent-owners than in a completely absentee-owned area.. It should be
1 Interview with Mrs. Arnice Straughter, Feb. 1, 1968.
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noted that the side effects BRL has encountered are the results of re-
habilitation rather than of ownership itself; a similar rehabilitation
program for rental units might produce the same neighborhood improve-
ments.
IICC paints all of its houses white, a daring thing to do in
Philadelphia's slums, and as yet has not had one of its properties de-
faced. In one area, the neighbors called the police when they noticed
vandals attacking a house that IICC was rehabilitating.. The police, as
IICC tells it, had to look up the location in their books - they had not
had a call from Lambert Street in years.
The communities created by Flanner House Homes are perhaps the
strongest example of the potential effect of ownership on a neighbor-
hood. The two FHH sites are areas of 100% owner-occupancy, and the
residents worked together to build their homes, so it is to be expected
that this would be the most striking case. The neighborhoods, including
the lawns, streets, and sidewalks, are spotless. The yards and gardens
show signs of much care. Each of the sites has an extremely strong
neighborhood organization. Whenever one of the residents fails to paint
his house or to discard a wrecked car, the organization either puts
pressure on him to do so or helps him with the job if he is unable to
do it. Flanner House created neighborhoods rather than upgrading them,
however, and benefited from the group sweat equity as well as from own-
ership.
Home ownership then can and does have some beneficial effects on
the general quality of a neighborhood, but it has by no means yet been
proven or even suggested that ownership. by itself can substantially
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upgrade a declining neighborhood. Even though BCIC has rehabilitated
and converted to ownership one-quarter of the residences in its nine
blocks, it has not yet succeeded in transforming the neighborhood,
which is still considered one of the less desirable areas of St. Louis.
Except for participants in BCIC's program, there has been little demand
to live there. Perhaps, as the directors of BCIC believe, the situa-
tion will change when a greater percentage of the houses have been
converted to resident ownership. But for the present, the burden of
upgrading a neighborhood should not be added to the other benefits ex-
pected from home ownership. Any such results, like any of the "intangi-
ble" effects on the home owner, should be considered ancillary benefits.
CHAPTER IV
HOW SHOULD HOME OWNERSHIP BE ENCOURAGED?
This chapter will be devoted to a discussion of the practical
aspects of designing and conducting'a large-scale home ownership pro-
gram for low-income people. Given the justifications presented in the
preceding pages, and given the fact that a national ownership program
seems likely to be enacted very soon, what can be said about the form
which such a program should take?
The answers provided in this chapter are based largely on the
analysis made of the experiences of the five ownership projects. The
following seven topics will be considered:
A. Selecting potentially successful home owners.
B. Credit as a tool for encouraging home ownership.
C. Other mechanisms for encouraging home ownership.
D. Income levels, subsidies, and cost.
E. Geographical focus.
F. Houses to be purchased.
G. Role of the sponsor organization.
A. Selecting Potentially Successful Home Owners
Obviously, not every low-income family wants to or is suited to
become a home owner. Unqualified families may suffer a substantial
financial as well as psychological loss from foreclosure, especially
if foreclosure comes during the first few years of ownership when the
mortgage has been amortized only slightly. In addition, foreclosure
may mean a serious disruption or inconvenience in the family's daily
life, and can severely damage its credit rating. Families that are
unqualified for ownership because of an inability or lack of desire to
care for their own homes may also find ownership a distasteful experi-
ence.
For these reasons, the five ownership projects have spent a
large part of their time and energy screening their applicants and se-
lecting those families that show a potential for home ownership. The
selection process is a vital although difficult procedure and must be-
come a part of any national low-income ownership program.
Which kinds of families make successful home owners? "Successful"
home owners will be defined here as those owners who:
1. Make their monthly mortgage payments on time and therefore are
not threatened with foreclosure;
2. Maintain their homes in good physical condition; and
3. Are able to afford the costs of ownership without having to
forego other necessary expenditures.
In 1963, the FHA made a study of its experiences with single-
family mortgage defaults, foreclosures, and property acquisitions.1 The
study included a statistical analysis of the loan characteristics of
2
all mortgages acquired by the FHA between July 1, 1961, and March 31,
1 U.S. Federal Housing Administration, FEA Experience With Mort-
gage Foreclosures and Property Acquisitions (Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1963).
2.
The FHA "acquires" a home after it has been foreclosed if the
FHA is the highest bidder for it. The "acquisition ratio" is equal to
the number of properties acquired divided by the total number of pro-
perties insured.
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1962, as compared with the loan characteristics of all mortgages insured
from 1958 to 1961. As might be expected, the analysis found that homes
of lower value, mortgages with lower down payments, and mortgages with.
longer amortization periods had higher acquisition ratios than did higher
priced homes or mortgages with higher down payments and shorter amorti-
zation periods. The startling conclusion, however, which seemed to sur-
prise even the FHA, was that no significant correlation could. be found
between low incomes and high acquisition ratios. In the words of the re-
port,
The lack of clear cut patterns may be partially due to the
less complete data and the smallness of the sample of acquired
cases available for comparative purposes. However, on the ba-
sis of the facts available, it appears that borrower income
alone is not a clear indicator of the probability of acquisi-
tion. As the figures show, there is some tendency toward a
relationship between low income brackets and higher than nor-
mal acquisition rates. However, the pattern is far from clear
and consistent. Thus, it would appear that borrower income
is not---in and of itself---as significant a factor in property
acquisitions as loan-to-value ratios and house prices.
1
The Housing and Home Finance Agency also did a study of mortgage
foreclosures in 1963. The emphasis here was on reasons for foreclosure
rather than on loan characteristics. The study was based on a sample
of foreclosures which occurred in six metropolitan areas from April 1,
1961, to March 31, 1962. FHA, VA, and conventional mortgages on one-to-
four family owner-occupied homes were included.
The study found that the primary reason for foreclosure on all
1 U.S. Federal Housing Administration, pp. 36+39.
2 U.S. Housing and Home Finance Agency, Office of Program
Policy, "Mortgage Foreclosures In Six Metropolitan Areas," June,
1963.
three types of loans was curtailment of income. In each of the six
metropolitan areas, at least 4L% of the foreclosed borrowers experienced
a decline in income between the time of loan origination and the time of
foreclosure. The main factors leading to the curtailment in income were
layoffs and a cut in work-week or wages. A substantial proportion of
the foreclosed borrowers reported working less than 40 weeks in 1961,
The reduced employment reflected the occupations of many of the
borrowers. Between one-half and two-thirds of the FHA and VA borrowers,
and between one-quarter and one-half of the conventional loan borrowers,
were nonfarm laborers, operatives, and craftsmen. These three occupa-
tions had the highest nonfarm unemployment rates reported by the Depart-
ment of Labor in January of 1961 and 1962. The HHFA study also found a
positive correlation between the unemployment rate and the annual number
of nonfarm real estate foreclosures from 1948 to 1962.
The second most frequent reason given for foreclosure was death
or illness in the family, and the third was marital difficulties. Both
of these factors usually result in a reduction in family income.
The conclusion of the HHFA was that:
There are many aspects to the rise in residential mortgage
foreclosures in recent years. Other analyses of the problem
have generally emphasized changes toward liberalization of
mortgage credit terms and the cessation of inflation in hous-
ing prices as they related to increased frequencies of fore-
closures. There is no doubt that these factors are significant,
as the data in this study tend to confirm. The data obtained
in the study, particularly the information provided by borrowers,
indicated, however, that much greater emphasis than in the past
should be given to the relationships between curtailment of
borrower income through unemployment and foreclosures in
analyzing the reasons for foreclosure and possible methods to
reduce the incidence of foreclosures in the future.1
1 Ibid., p. 12.
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These two studies taken together imply that steadiness of income
is more important than level of income, and that low-income families
can therefore become successful home owners. The analysis made by
1
Gloria Richards of the results of the Lincoln Estates experiment lends
striking support to these conclusions.
Mrs. Richards did a statistical analysis of the extent to which
the Lincoln Estates families made their mortgage payments on time, She
calculated a "delinquency ratio" for each family; this was equal to the
number of late payments divided by the total number of payments made.
This ratio was then correlated with other family characteristics, such
as income, age of family head, years of marriage, and credit rating.
As was expected, the older, more mature families with longer,
more stable marriages had relatively low delinquency ratios. However,
as was not expected, the families with the highest incomes did not have
the lowest delinquency ratios, nor did the families with the lowest in-
comes have the highest ratios. The anticipated relationship was actual-
ly reversed among the 50 demonstration families and did not show up at
all strongly for the other families living in Lincoln Estates (the "con-
trol group"). Among the 50 families, those with above-average incomes
had slightly more trouble than those with below-average incomes in mak-
ing their mortgage payments on time. "For the two groups taken together,
family incomes do not seem to have significant explanatory power in con-
nection with high and low delinquency ratios."
Richards and Blodgett, pp, 45-65.
2 Ibid., p. 49.
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The family's credit rating, as determined by the demonstration
directors at the time the mortgage was applied for, and the familyis
delinquency ratio were also compared. The expected relationship be-
tween these two factors was found to be extremely strong for both the
demonstration and the control groups. Previous credit ratings, con-
cluded Mrs. Richards, are a good indicator of whether or not a family
is likely to become a successful home owner. She emphasized, however,
that the credit report must be an accurate and sensitive measure of the
family's true credit position. The credit reports being used by the
FHA were in many cases found to be inaccurate or insensitive to the
problems of the low-income family and were not reliable indicators of
the actual mortgage risk presented by the family,
Mrs. Richards also concurred in the HHFA finding that marital
difficulties are an important source of mortgage difficulty, and empha-
sized the need for an accurate and personalized evaluation of the fam-
ily's credit rating:
Marital difficulty causes the majority of the problems con-
nected with mortgage delinquency and default and knowledge
of this beforehand, whenever possible, would be a better
help in evaluating credit risks. In evaluating marginal
credit risks additional information which can be supplied
by neighbors, employers and other persons with whom a family
relates in the daily course of daily living is as necessary
as a credit report. .
Evaluating credit information is a subjective process, Per-
sonal interviews and a detailed checking of a person's credit
history are necessary in evaluating marginal credit risks. 1
And finally, Mrs. Richards pointed to the intangible yet vital
element which must be present in order to achieve successful home
1 Senate Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs, Hearings,
1967, pp. 833--34.
ownership:
Motivation is the hardest factor to evaluate. Motivation dis-
tinguishes the successful family from the nonsuccessful family
. . . . A family of 13 persons living in a 3 bedroom home is
meeting all financial obligations on an annual income of
$3,700. Another family of 5 persons with an annual income of
over $8,000 is always avoiding bill collectors,1
Thus, steadiness of income and employment, credit record, marital
stability, and motivation seem to be the chief indicators of successful
home ownership. The first two factors are relatively easy to determine;
the last two seem difficult if not impossible to measure. The five home
ownership projects seem naturally or by trial and error to have arrived
at the use of these four criteria in selecting their home owners.
Each of the projects has a staff member or members in charge of
screening applicants. These people interview the applicants, investigate
the family's income and employment situation, and order a credit check
and discuss it with the family. In addition, most of the interviewers
like to visit the family in its present residence, in order to get a
better idea of the family's housekeeping ability and home life. None of
the projects has as yet accepted a welfare mother or other single-parent
family.
Better Rochester Living has a relatively well-formulated set of
criteria for screening applicants. BRL requires that the head of the
family have been employed in one job or in a series of progressively
better jobs for the past two years. As far as credit is concerned, the
family must have all collections and judgments paid up, must have a two-
year record of "clean credit," and must.have its monthly credit payments
1 Ibid.,-pp. 835 + 826.
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down to one week's pay. The interviewer visits the family's present
residence in order to measure homemaking ability and looks for signs of
self-reliance, good maintenance, and improvements the family has made
on its own. BRL also includes family stability as one of the criteria,
but this measure has not been frequently used because it is so diffi-
cult to determine. These employment, credit, motivational, and family
stability criteria are guidelines rather than rigid rules, but they il-
lustrate a thoughtful use of what seem to be the major factors in deter-
mining a family's potential for successful ownership.
The home ownership projects have been quite successful in their
selection of home owners. BCIC has had only three "failurest out of
its 75 families. In the first family to fail, the husband died; in the
second, the husband and wife separated; in the third, the couple was
apparently not stable enough for the responsibilities of ownership. In
each of these cases, the family simply left, and BCIC found a new owner;
no foreclosures were involved.
None of the IICC or BRL families has faced foreclosure or even
left its home. Out of the 12 IICC owners, only one family, in which
the wife died, has not made mortgage payments on time. BRL has an
agreement with the banks to be informed whenever families get behind with
their mortgage payments. Only one family has been more than a month
late, and the project director was able to straighten this out by talk-
ing with and counseling the family.
The other two criteria for successful ownership -.property main-
tenance and financial adequacy - have been fulfilled by almost every one
of the owners at the five projects. As noted before, the owners have
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kept their homes in surprisingly good condition. The projects do not
accept families whose incomes are too low to afford the costs of owner-
ship, and by supplying employment counseling and helping the families to
find better jobs, they have avoided any serious curtailments of income,
The projects may so far have been skimming the cream of the ap-
plicant families. It is possible that if the scale of the ownership
program were increased significantly, there would be a much higher pro-
portion of unsuccessful owners. The directors at the projects do not
believe that this is true. They feel that there are many more families
similar to those they have accepted that would like to become home own-
ers, and that it is the lack of money and financing rather than the lack
of.qualified families that is keeping them from expanding much faster.
It is difficult to say how much of the successful ownership has
been due to screening procedures and how much to self-selection or
guidance and counseling. It can be said, however, that the experiences
of the projects seem to support the theoretical conclusion that employ-
ment, credit, family stability, and motivation are the most important
factors to consider in selecting potentially successful home owners.
B. Credit as A Tool for Encouraging Home Ownership
Mortgage credit is vital to home ownership in the United States.
Fewer than 15% of all families can pay the full price of a house at the
time of purchase. The lower a family's income, the more necessary
credit becomes; almost no low-income family can afford to buy a home
without some kind of loan. The state of the mortgage market affects
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the demand for housing. When mortgage credit becomes tight, there is
a decrease in the number of families who want and are able to become
home owners; when mortgage credit loosens, there is an increase in the
demand for ownership.
Although low-income families are particularly dependent upon
credit, they face a perpetually tight mortgage market., In general,
mortgagees make loan decisions on the basis of three factors: the income
level of the borrower, the condition of the house to be purchased, and
the location of the property. Since low-income families present greater
mortgage risks than do middle- or upper-income families, mortgagees will
either refuse to make loans to them or make the loans at higher interest
rates and with higher down payments. In addition to being greater risks,
low-income families generally take out smaller mortgages. The cost of
servicing a $25,000 mortgage is the same as the cost of servicing an
$8,000 mortgage; therefore, the larger the mortgage, the greater the
profit to the banks. Banks are merely following sound business practices
when they discriminate against low-income people.
The kind of houses which low-income people buy also adds to their
difficulty in obtaining credit. Most of the homes they can afford are
existing, older homes, usually in center-city areas. But as noted be-
fore, mortgagees evaluate the condition and location of the home; ex-
isting center-city houses are a greater risk than are new suburban
houses. George Sternlieb, in his study of Newark, documented the
scarcity of mortgage credit in older neighborhoods,2 although this con-
1 Jack Guttentag, "The Short Cycle in Residential Construction,"
American Economic Review, LI (June, 1961), 275-298.
2 "The bulk of slum properties, be they in Newark or New York
City or any other major core area, no longer can secure any reasonable
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dition is so predictable and well-known that it hardly needs document-
ing.
As mentioned in Chapter I, the FHA has been even more conserva-
tive with respect to low-income families and center-city areas than con-
ventional lenders have been. Recently, the FHA has begun to discuss
1
this situation openly and to try to.correct it. These efforts, how-
ever, have not yet had a visible impact.
Less favorable mortgage financing can make a 20-year-old house
in the slums as expensive as a brand new house in the suburbs. For ex-
ample, the monthly payment for principal and interest on a $9,500 house
with a 15-year mortgage at 7% interest is equal to the payment on a
$14,000 house with a 25-year mortgage at 6% interest.2
The Philadelphia Housing Association did a study of the compara-
tive costs of buying new and existing housing. The study concluded
(Footnote 2 continued from p. 102)
form of mortgage credit. The banks, the mortgage companies, the savings
and loans have all deserted the area. The great bulk of transfers which
we have noted in our studies are typically accompanied by purchase money
type of financing. These typically involve very short terms (and there-
fore a very high amortization rate) not infrequently involve substantial
bonuses and are always at the maximum rates of interest." (Senate Sub-
committee on Housing and Urban Affairs, Hearings, p., 1608).,
1 For instance, in announcing a policy of relaxing FHA economic
soundness requirements for riot areas, P.N. Brownstein said:
"In some instances, there has been a hesitancy on the part of
insuring offices to make FHA programs available in older neighborhoods.
An automatic exclusion of a community or neighborhood merely because it
is old can result in the shutting off of capital investments in these
areas. The non-availability of mortgage funds accelerates decline and
increases the costs and problems of financing real estate." (Quoted in
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development News Release, August 2,
1967).
2 This assumes a 20% down payment under both mortgages.
Linda Niebanck, "Financing Existing Housing," Philadelphia
Housing Association Policy Committee, Working Paper Number 11, May,1964.
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that because of the considerably less advantageous mortgage terms avail-
able for existing housing, a family which could not afford to buy a new
house in Philadelphia usually could not afford to buy an existing house
either. In 1964, when the study was done, an FHA mortgage could be se-
cured on a new house at 5 3/4% interest, with a 5% down payment, for
30 years. For an existing house, the typical loan available was a con-
ventionally-financed mortgage at 6% interest, with a 25% down payment,
for 15 years.
The higher interest rates and shorter loan periods available can
thus make existing center-city housing as expensive as new suburban
housing. In addition, the higher down payments required may make home
ownership impossible for the low-income family. Under Section 203, a
new home can be financed with only a 3% down payment, whereas the best
terms available under conventional financing for an existing house usu-
ally include a 20% down payment. This means that on a $10,000 existing
house, a down payment of $2,000 would be needed. But very few low-
income families save at all, and almost none are likely to have $2,000
or be able to accumulate it within a reasonable period of time. The
down payment required for the kinds of housing which low-income families
can afford thus may present an insurmountable barrier to home ownership,
The scarcity of liberal mortgage financing can lead to further
decline of a center-city area, as well as to preventing low-income fami-
lies from achieving home ownership. Families that can afford to purchase
homes in better neighborhoods will do so, with the result that there
1 See the table of liquid assets held by families of various
income levels. 'Table 18, p. 109.
105
will be little market demand for homes in declining areas, The only
purchasers will be absentee landlords and speculators who buy at de-
pressed prices and rent at inflated rates to the low-income families
that have no choice but to rent. As an area declines, credit leaves,
and as credit- leaves, the area declines, in a reinforcing spiral rela-
tionship.
A few scattered efforts have been made at increasing the availa-
bility of liberal mortgage financing for resident-ownership in older
neighborhoods. For example, the New York Times of April 2, 1968 re-
ported that a $100 million pool of mortgage money had been pledged for
homes in the Bedford-Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn. The pool would be
used to provide FHA-insured mortgages at the going FHA interest rate,
with 10% down payments and terms of up to 25 years, for the purchase or
rehabilitation of one-to-four-family homes.
This type of measure should be expanded as a first step in a na-
tionwide home ownership program. Before we attempt a policy which in-
volves the subsidization of interest rates, as all of the home ownership
measures which have been suggested recently have proposed, we should try
the much simpler and less costly policy of increasing the availability
of liberal mortgage financing in older neighborhoods. A program which
provides the same kinds of mortgages on existing housing for low-income
families as are available for middle-income families on new housing
could go a long way toward stimulating low-income ownership.,
For families below certain income levels, however, the mere avail-
ability of mortgages at free market terms will not be enough. If the
1 See Section D of this Chapter for a discussion of income levels
and subsidies needed.
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Government wishes to help these families become home owners, it will
have to provide mortgages at easier terms. In other words, it will have
to subsidize home ownership, just as the Government now subsidizes public
housing and rental (d)(3) housing.
The Federal Government has traditionally used the credit mechanism
as a means for achieving housing policies. There are three variables of
the credit mechanism which can be manipulated: (1) interest rates, (2)
down payments or loan-to-value ratios, and (3) length of mortgage or
mortgage maturity. The policies followed by the FHA have resulted in a
substantial liberalization in the last two variables over the past 30
years. The loan-to-value ratio has been pushed steadily upward until
it is now a maximum of 97% under the regular Section 203, and 100% under
the low- and moderate-income programs. The mortgage maturity period has
been extended to 35 years for Section 203 borrowers, and goes up to 40
years under other Federal programs.
Raising the loan-to-value ratio results in a larger monthly mort-
gage payment on a house of a given price. However, it makes home pur-
chase feasible for families who have not accumulated assets but do have
a steady source of income. There are many low-income families that have
no liquid assets and cannot afford to accumulate a down payment in addi-
tion to paying their rent. For these families, 97% to 100% mortgages
are a necessity. However, the loan-to-value ratio has already been used
to the fullest as a means for liberalizing mortgage terms; it cannot be
pushed beyond its present maximum of 100%.
There are thus two remaining ways in which mortgage terms can be
made easier: a-further extension of mortgage maturity and a lowering
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of interest rates. A reduction of the interest rate from 6% to 3%
under a 10-year mortgage will reduce monthly paymentsi from $11,11 per
thousand dollars of mortgage to $9.66 per thousand dollars of mortgage,
or 13%; under a 20-year mortgage, from $7.17 to $5.55 per thousand, or
21.5%; and under a 40-year mortgage, from $5.51 to $3.58 per thousand,
or 35%. In other words, the longer the mortgage, the greater will be
the effect of a given reduction in the interest rate.
At a given interest rate, extensions in the mortgage maturity be-
come less and less effective as the term of the mortgage is lengthened.
For instance, at 6% interest with a 10-year mortgage, the monthly pay-
ment is $11.11 per thousand. Lengthening the maturity to 20 years re-
duces the payment to $7.17, or 35.5%. Lengthening it to 30 years reduces
the payment to $6.00, or an additional 16%; and lengthening it to 40
years reduces it by only another 49 cents, or- 8%.
However, at a given mortgage maturity, reductions in the interest
rate do not become less and less effective as the rate decreases. In
fact, the percentage by which monthly payments are reduced increases
slightly as the interest rate is lowered. For example, with a 25-year
mortgage at 6% interest, monthly payments are $6.45 per thousand dollars
of loan. Reducing the interest rate to 5% lowers the payment to $5.85,
or 9.3%. Reducing it to 4% lowers the payment to $5.28, or an addi-
tional 9.7%; reducing it to 3% lowers the payment to $4.74, or another
10.2%, etc. This pattern is even more pronounced with a 40-year mortgage.
1 "Monthly mortgage payment" will be used in this section to re-
fer to the payment for principal and interest.
2 See Table 19, p. 110,
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Since Federal policies have already extended the maximum mortgage
maturity to 40 years, further extensions will not have a significant
effect on reducing monthly payments. There is great potential left,
however, for reducing or subsidizing interest rates. The same reduction
which can be achieved by lengthening a 6% mortgage from 30 to 40 years,
an extension of 33%, can be achieved by lowering a 30-year mortgage from
6% to about 5 1/4%, a reduction of only 12.5%.
In other words, the reduction of interest rates is the most im-
portant weapon remaining in the Federal Government's credit arsenal.
Raising the loan-to-value ratio and extending the mortgage maturity seem
to have- been exhausted as means for lowering monthly payments. Of
course, there is still work to be done in making sure that the legally
permissible 100% 30- or 40-year mortgages are in fact available, but
there is little that raising the legal limits can do.
As demonstrated earlier, the effectiveness of reductions in the
interest rate increases as the mortgage term is lengthened. Given the
30- or 40-year mortgages allowed today, interest rate reduction can be
an extremely powerful tool. This is why all of the home ownership mea-
sures proposed recently have concentrated on subsidizing interest rates.
Only the subsidization of principal has more potential as a credit me-
chanism for lowering the costs of ownership.
C. Other Mechanisms for Encouraging Home Ownership
There are other mechanisms besides credit manipulation which can
be used to encourage or facilitate home ownership. These mechanisms
include the following six, which will be discussed in this section:
TABLE 18
LIQUID ASSETS BY INCOME, 1959
Total Liquid Assets
INCOME
Under $1,000
$1,000-1,999
$2,000-2,999
$3,000-3,999
$4,ooo-4,999
$5,000-5,999
$6,000-T,499
$7,500-9,999
$10,000 and over
All spending units
Less than
$1.00
61%
50
44
28
21
14
7
4
2
25
$1-
$199
8%
14
15
25
28
26
24
13
4
18
$200-
$499
9%
10
9
11
17
17
19
15
8
13
$500-
$999
6%
10
9
8
11
13
15
20
10
12
Note: Rows add across to 100%.
Source: Federal Reserve Board, 1959 Survey of Consumer Finances - The Financial Position of Consumers,
Table 7, p. 715. Reprinted in Linda Niebanck, Financing Existing Housing, Philadelphia Housing
Association Policy Committee, 1964, p. 21.
$1,000--
$1,999
6%
6
7
10
8
11
14
14
16
10
$2,000-
$4,999
5%
5
8
11
8
13
15
20
26
12
$5,000
$9,999
2%
3
5
5
5
4
4
9
15
6
$10,000
and over
2%
2
3
2
3
2
3
5
19
4
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TABLE 19
MONTHLY MORTGAGE PAYENIrhTS (PRINCIPAL + INTEREST)
PER $1000 OF ORIGINAL MORTGAGE AMOUNT
Interest Rate
0% 1% 2% 3%
$8.33 $8.76 $9.,21 $9.66 $10.13 $1o.61 $11-11
5.55 5.99 6.44 6.91 7.40
4.17 4.60 5,o6 5.55 - 6.o6
3.33 3.77 4,24 4.75
2.78 3.22 3.70 4.22
2.38 2.83 3.32 3.85
2.08 2.53 3.03 3.58
1.65 2.12 2.64 3.22
1.39 1.85 2.39 3.00
5.28
4.78
4.43
4.18
3.86
7.91
6,~6o
5,85
5.37
5.05
4.83
4.55
8.44
7.17
6.45
6.oo
5.71
5.51
5.27
3.67 4.39 5.15
Mortgage
Maturity
(Years)
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1. The provision of interim financing.
2. Sweat equity.
3. Lower insurance and tax rates.
4. Mortgage or foreclosure insurance.
5. Leasing for a trial period.
6. Counseling and ownership training.
1. The Provision of Interim Financing
Mortgage money is not the only kind of money which is needed to
run a home ownership program. Funding for administrative expenses and
"interim financing" are also needed. The administrative funds to pay
staff salaries and other overhead expenses usually necessitate only
modest amounts; these can be obtained either as donations from private
individuals and businesses, as grants from governmental and charitable
agencies, or as fees included in the sales price of the houses. The
five home ownership projects studied here have used all three of these
sources.
The "interim financing" or money needed to purchase and rehabili-
tate houses before they are sold to the low-income owner, however, is
of a different magnitude and nature. If a project plans to handle 55
houses a year, as does BRL, and if a period of a year elapses between
acquisition and resale, as at BRL, then $550,000 will be needed annually,
if we assume each house to be worth $10,000. This is more money than a
project can collect easily from private sources, and this amount obvi-
ously cannot be taken as fees from the sales prices of the houses. Un-
like administrative money, however, interim financing is recoverable;
the same $550,000 can be used again year after year. The only cost in-
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volved is the interest on the money used.
Interim financing can be secured as investments in the home owner-
ship project, as loans from a commercial bank, or, if donations are
large enough, as a donated revolving fund. The five home ownership
projects have encountered quite a bit of difficulty in obtaining interim
funds. Banks either do not want to be involved at all in such risky
ventures, or will do so only at their highest lending rates. Unless
the project wishes to lose money, it must include this high cost of capi-
tal in its resale price to the home owner.
The Government would therefore be assisting home ownership in
two ways by supplying interim financing at reasonable rates to local
sponsor organizations. In the first place, the availability of the
funds would save the projects much time and energy and numerous head-
aches, and would allow them to proceed more quickly and on a larger
scale. Secondly, the loans could be made at the cost of the money to
the Government, which would be at an interest rate somewhere between
that charged by the commercial banks and that paid by the subsidized
owners. This would lower the price of the house for the low-income
purchaser without any great cost to the Government.
2. Sweat Equity
Sweat equity is quite a controversial issue. Some people claim
that it is an inefficient and useless process, resulting in an expense
rather than a savings in the total cost of the house, Others argue
that it can save a good deal of money, can make ownership possible for
families that otherwise could never dream of ownership, and can instill
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a measure of pride and a sense of investment in a house as no amount of
cash ever could.
The directors at BRL swear by sweat equity and have almost miracu-
lous faith in it. They will not allow a family to buy a house unless it
is willing to invest some of its own sweat and labor, even if this means
that a house painted two years ago will have to be repainted, and even
though sweat equity requires a delay of eight to twelve months. It is
felt that doing some of the rehabilitation on its own home gives the fam-
ily drive, initiative, and inspiration, and also teaches the family about
home construction and maintenance so that it isn't necessary to call a
repairman every time a fifty-cent washer needs replacing.
The directors at Flanner House Homes also speak of sweat equity
with reverence. They claim that the prices of their houses were reduced
by 25% to 39% as a result of the sweat equity. It is clear that the men
gained a great deal of construction knowledge and perhaps initiative
from their experience, because almost every family has added a garage
or a recreation room, knocked out a wall, or remodeled some of its rooms
since it has become an owner. However, the men had to spend 20 hours a
week on their homes in addition to their regular jobs, which represents
a great deal of energy and commitment. In addition, no one has done a
comparative cost study to discover how much it would have cost profes-
sionals to do the work done by the owners. And finally, there have been
reports that one of the reasons the project has been discontinued is that
the men would now rather pay someone else to do the labor than do it
themselves. From the point of view of efficiency, it certainly makes
sense for the owner to spend his 20 hours a week doing work he is trained
to do, and to use the earnings from this work to hire skilled construc-
tion teams.
Both IICC and BCIC are wary of sweat equity. IICC feels that
the Quakers had a bad experience with it in Philadelphia. BCIC recalls
its abortive attempt at using neighborhood labor to do painting and de-
corating and has decided that the families should be provided with the
best houses possible. That attempt, though, did not involve owners
working on their own homes. IICC and BCIC are both open to considering
the use of sweat equity, particularly on a small scale like BRL. Cer-
tainly neither of them rejects sweat equity with the vehemence and evan-
gelism with which BRL and FHH defend it.
In sum, then, although the value of sweat equity has by no means
been proven, it does appear that sweat equity can have several beneficial
effects in encouraging home ownership. It can lower the cost of the
house, can provide the down payment and closing costs for families that
have no savings, can serve as an educational instrument for teaching
about home maintenance, and can increase the family's pride and sense of
investment in its house. On the other hand, it takes time and money to
teach a family the skills needed even to paint a house or put in a new
floor; delays may occur, and disappointment and a loss of interest re-
sult; many families do not want or are not able to perform the tasks in-
volved in rehabilitating a house. It may be more efficient or more to
the owner's liking to work at his own job and use his income to hire pro-
fessional contractors. Finally, the quality of the work done by the
family may not be as high as that which could be done by professionals.
If so, the family is purchasing an inferior house and may have to pay
for expensive repairs and renovation in the future.
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There seems to be no reason for a home ownership program to ex-
clude families who do not want or are not able to contribute their sweat
equity. since successful ownership has proven possible without sweat
equity. Beyond this, the decision as to how great a use should be made
of sweat equity should for the present be left up to the local sponsors.
In the long run, the decision will have to be made on the basis of fur-
ther experimentation and experience.
3. Lower Insurance and Tax Rates
Both credit manipulation and sweat equity result in either lower
down payments or lower payments for principal and interest. There are
in addition two other important components of monthly mortgage payments
which, if lowered, could reduce substantially the cost of ownership to
the low-income family. These are property insurance payments and taxes.
At Better Rochester Living, typical property taxes on a $10,000
house amount to $22.29 monthly, or almost one-quarter of the total
monthly payments. By contrast, at BCIC the taxes on a $9,500 house are
only $5 to $8 per month. Insurance rates can vary almost as widely as
tax rates from area to area and from city to city. Clearly, if insurance
and tax rates could be held down or reduced, home ownership would be
possible for many more low-income families.
Property insurance is both more difficult and more expensive to
obtain in core areas than in other parts of the city. It is not uncom-
mon to find center city residents who have had to go to Lloyd's of
London in order to procure insurance for their homes. The study done
by the President's National Advisory Panel on Insurance in Riot-Affected
Areas reported that:
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there is a serious lack of property insurance in our nation's
inner cities. Residents and businessmen from urban core areas
throughout the nation have stated that they cannot purchase the
property insurance they need. Some say they cannot find in-
surance at all. Others say that they cannot obtain insurance
at prices they are able to afford. Some who now have insurance
are afraid that their insurance will be cancelled in the near
future or not renewed. Many do not make legitimate claims for
fear of losing the insurance they have.1
Insurance companies are often justified in charging higher rates
or in not granting insurance in center-city areas, because risks are
higher there. But to the extent that companies "red line" whole dis-
tricts and refuse to insure any homes within these districts, they may
be ignoring the differences in risk from house to house and from street
to street. According to the President's Panel,
None of these factors of poor risk in urban core areas may be
of significance with respect to any individual property.
Applications for insurance must be considered on their indivi-
dual merits if everyone is to have fair access to insurance. 2
Cutting off property insurance to an area can accelerate its de-
cline, just as cutting off mortgage insurance can. The same sort of re-
inforcing spiral relationship may be found between deterioration and the
lack of reasonably-priced insurance as is found between deterioration
and the lack of mortgage credit.
Some representatives of insurance companies have said that if
the underlying problems of urban blight were corrected, in-
surance would be readily available. But if insurance were
more readily available for property that is adequately main-
tained, the underlying problems of urban blight would be more
readily corrected. 3
1 The President's National Advisory Panel on Insurance in Riot-
Affected Areas, Mleeting the Insurance Crisis of Our Cities (Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 2.
2 Ibid., p. 7.
3 Ibid.
117
Insurance companies must be encouraged to evaluate homes in older
neighborhoods on an individual basis. For whole areas where companies
presently refuse to insure, insurance pools should be formed to share
the higher risk. This suggestion has been made recently by the insurance
companies themselves, and was one' of the five recommendations made by
the President's Panel on Insurance..
Taxes may also be proportionately higher in central city areas
where low-income families live than in the better areas and suburbs where
middle- and upper-class families live. A study done by Oldman and Aaron'
in 1965 compared the assessment-sales ratios (assessment as a percentage
of market value) among various areas of the city of Boston. The study
found that the lowest ratios prevailed in Hyde Park and West Roxbury,
which had the highest median family income of all the areas studied, and
that the highest ratios prevailed in the Negro ghetto of Roxbury and in
the urban core.
A study prepared for the National Commission on Urban Problems
similarly found that the impact of the real property tax falls most
heavily on the poor. As reported by the New York Times, the finding
was that "in a large proportion of metropolitan areas, the effective
property tax rates are 'substantially higher' in the central cities than
in the surrounding suburban areas "
1 Oliver Oldman and Henry Aaron, "Assessment-Sales Ratios Under
the Boston Property Tax," National Tax Journal, XVII (March, 1965), pp.
36-48.
2 New York Times, May 5, 1968, p. 40. The article reported a
research study done by Richard Netzer for the National Commission on
Urban Problems, which is headed by former Senator Paul H. Douglas.
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If taxes are higher in older neighborhoods than in other areas of
a city, then all that need be done to reduce taxes for low-income owners
is to make the assessments within the city more equitable. If taxes are
uniformly higher within a city than in the surrounding suburbs, however,
the issue becomes a problem in metropolitan rather than city-wide govern-
ment. The only way the city can bring its taxes into line with the
suburbs is to reduce its level of services, which is certainly not a
happy solution for the low-income city dweller. In such cases, interven-
tion from a higher level of government, including perhaps a redistribu-
tion to the cities of tax revenues received by the State or Federal
Government, is necessary.
Most of the home ownership projects studied here have thus far
relied on "pull" to secure lower insuranceand tax rates for their home
owners; someone on their board knows an insurance company president, or
the tax assessor, etc. Such reductions can be a significant help in
lowering the costs of ownership. In order to encourage low-income owner-
ship, equitable rates should become a matter of policy rather than of
pull. They should be available to all low-income owners, not just to
those represented by an influential organization,
4. Mortgage or Foreclosure Insurance
Charles Abrams has been proposing for years that home owners
should have mortgage insurance which would protect them against the risks
11
of unemployment.1 A number of mortgagees have in fact arranged for
See for example Charles Abrams, "Equity Insurance for the For-
gotten Owner," Housing Yearbook (1954), pp. 35-37; and Charles Abrams,
The City is The Frontier (New York: Harper Colophon Books, Harper & Row,
Publishers, 1965), pp. 262-65.
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mortgage insurance to protect against illness, accident, or death, but
no company has ever issued a policy which would take over mortgage pay-
ments when the owner is unemployed.
This is an interesting idea, particularly for low-income families,
who are especially susceptible to unemployment and who usually have no
resources other than their income. Since there has been no experience
with such a plan, no final judgment can be made here. Instead, the
theoretical pros and cons of the issue will be presented,
There are several drawbacks to foreclosure insurance. First of
all, insurance costs money. In order for an owner to be covered, he
would have to make monthly foreclosure insurance payments, which might
again put ownership beyond the financial reach of the low-income family,
Secondly, if ownership provides an incentive to stay employed
because the mortgage must be paid every month, then mortgage insurance
would lessen this incentive. It would be extremely difficult to tell
when the owner was actually seeking work but turning down jobs because
they were inappropriate, and when he was just "cashing in" on his in-
surance.
And finally, the best insurance against unemployment is another
job. All of the home ownership projects have found that the most ef-
fective way to assist their owners to maintain their monthly payments
is to help them to find a job or better employment, It thus might be
more important and worthwhile for a national ownership program to make
sure that a good employment service and an effective job-training program
are available than to begin a system of foreclosure insurance.
On the other hand, if the foreclosure rate were as low under a
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national ownership program as it has been under the five private owner-
ship projects, then the required monthly insurance premium would be cor-
respondingly low. The owners might find the protection against costly
foreclosure worth the small monthly payment required.
Secondly, it has been proposed that the Government provide the
mortgage insurance under a low-income ownership program. If it did so,
the owners would be protected without any increase in their monthly pay-
ments, since they would in effect be receiving an additional subsidy.
Thirdly, there are compromise or partial mortgage insurance plans
which might overcome or reduce the drawbacks. If the owner were compen-
sated for only a part of his mortgage payment when unemployed, or if
the full payment were made for only a limited time, then the effect on
destroying the incentive to seek employment would be lessened.. To the
extent that compensation is limited, of course, the owner is only par-
tially protected.
Perhaps the best plan.would be for the bank to declare a moratorium
for a month or two while the owner is unemployed and looking for a new
job. This might be beneficial to both the owner and the bank, and com-
bined with strong employment counseling might eliminate the need for in-
surance. All of these various plans and programs must be tested, perhaps
in demonstration projects under the new national ownership program, before
the best plan can be chosen.
5. Leasing for A Trial Period
The home owners at BRL live in their new houses as renters for a
trial period of eight to twelve months. In its new program, BRL will
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allow renting for up to two or three years. BCIC at first sold its
houses to the new owners immediately but later decided that it was bet-
ter to require a year of rental. Flanner House Homes had no leasing for
a trial period, but the owners spent from nine to eighteen months build-
ing their homes. During this time, the owners could receive ownership
training, prepare themselves for their new responsibilities, drop out of
the project if they wished, or be asked to leave by Flanner House. IICC
also has no trial leasing period, but it is the only project which re-
quires the owners to make a cash down payment. The time needed to ac-
cumulate this down payment, and the interest which is evidenced when it
is finally accumulated, may serve the same purpose as that served by
leasing for a trial period.
The implication of these experiences, taken together, is that in
the absence of a down payment, some other mechanism is necessary to in-
sure that a family has a stake in purchasing a home. It is not benefi-
cial either to the home ownership project or to the purchasers themselves
to allow unprepared people to buy houses too quickly or too casually.
The foreclosures and unpleasantness which may result would be harmful to
everyone concerned.
Leasing for a trial period can greatly reduce the possibility of
foreclosure, as the home ownership projects have learned. Studies done
by the FHA1 and HHFA2 confirm this by showing that the greatest risk of
1 U.S. Federal Housing Administration, FHA Experience With Mort-
,age Foreclosures and Property Acquisitions (Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1963),
2 U.S. Housing and Home Finance Agency, Office of Program Policy,
"Mortgage Foreclosures In Six Metropolitan Areas," June, 1963.
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foreclosure occurs during the first year or two of the life of a mort-
gage. The FHA, in a study of mortgages acquired (bought by the FHA after
foreclosure) between July 1, 1960, and March 31, 1962, found that
a very high proportion had been insured within the preceding
three years ... .With low downpayment mortgages particularly,
the accumulation on equity with the passage of time reduces
the probability of property acquisitions...[This was] con-
sistent with previous experience that acquisitions are most
common within the first three years after insurance.1
In its study of mortgage foreclosures in six metropolitan areas, the
HHFA analyzed FHA foreclosures by the age of mortgage. The breakdown
2
was as follows:
Age of Mortgage FHA Foreclosures
2 years or less 69%
3-4 years 22
5-7 years 7
8 years or more 2
Many of the troubles which a purchaser encounters during his
first year or two of ownership could be smoothed out during a trial
period as a renter. This mephanism can be especially effective if the
renter makes the same monthly mortgage payments as a tenant that he will
later have to make as an owner, so that he becomes used to the financial
responsibilities of ownership. Like a down payment or sweat equity,
leasing for a trial period both demonstrates and develops the ability
and desire to become a home owner. At least one or perhaps a combina-
tion of two or three of these mechanisms would se-em to be vital to the
success of any home ownership program.
1 U.S. Fedferal Housing Administration, p. 13.
2 U.S. Housing and Home Finance Agency, p. 70.
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6. Counseling and Ownership Training
All five of the home ownership projects studied here provide
some kind of counseling or training to the new owners both before and
after the house is purchased. This guidance serves to encourage families
to assume the responsibilities of ownership and helps equip them to do
SO.
At IICC, clergymen counsel the potential home owners for as much
as eight months before the house is bought. Better Rochester Living
leaves most of the counseling to volunteer civic and charitable organi-
zations and individuals, and refers more difficult problems to local so-
cial service agencies. BCIC originally provided quite a variety of
training and guidance programs but now concentrates on budgeting and
employment counseling and refers families with other kinds of problems
to nearby service organizations. Flanner House Homes held a series of
seminars about ownership while the houses were being built and employed
a social worker to assist families that encountered problems during the
building period. At Lincoln Estates, counseling was available to the
"control group" as well as to the 50 demonstration families,
Through this wide variety of programs, two kinds of counseling
emerge as common and essential to all. These are budgeting or credit
counseling, and employment assistance. A third, homemaking guidance,
seemed to be considered by all of the projects but regarded as of some-
what less importance. The families seem to be most in need of help with
managing their finances and with finding employment or upgrading their
jobs; these are therefore the services upon which the project staffs
should concentrate.
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There are various ways in which these services can be provided.
None of the projects has either a formal employment program or formal
budget assistance. At most, an informal network of contacts has been
developed to secure jobs for participants who need them. To date, most
of the employment programs have operated as emergency rescue operations
rather than as systematic training or counseling services-
Most of the budget assistance, too, has been on a rather informal
basis. At Lincoln Estates, which had the most active counseling program,
Gloria Richards reports that the budgets which the families were helped
to work out in their extensive guidance sessions were probably never
followed. The counseling did, however, make the families aware of their
budget problems and of the fact that the problems could be overcome. She
feels that this in itself was a big achievement. In Mrs.. Richards'
words, "They learned for the first time that instead of their always
working for money, money could be made to work for them.,"
D. Income Levels, Subsidies, and Cost
Now that we have discussed the various ways in which low-income
families can be assisted to become home owners, we come to the question
of which families ought to be allowed to benefit from such assistance.
In Chapter I, "low-income families" were defined loosely as those families
that are not able to purchase their own homes under existing market con-
ditions. In this chapter, the term will be examined more precisely. For
what income levels should the Government subsidize ownership, and what
should these subsidies be?
1 Telephone conversation, April 3, 1968.
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If the Government is committed to home ownership as a desirable
end in itself, then there are several measures which should not be re-
stricted by income level, or indeed restricted at all. Counseling and
ownership training, for instance, could be made available to any family
that wanted to purchase a home, just as free advice is now available to
any small business owner who wants it. Certainly property tax rates
should be reduced in center-city areas until they are in line with rates
elsewhere, no matter what income-level families are buying property in
the center city. And if the Government wanted to, it could purchase
homes and rent them to prospective owners of any income with an option
to purchase within a year or two, in order to encourage ownership. Under
such a program, the Government could buy only substandard dwellingsre-
habilitating them before renting, and thus achieve an upgrading of the
housing stock as well as an increase in ownership.
Measures which involve subsidies should be used for "low-income"
families that cannot afford ownership by themselves. The answer to
which families can afford ownership depends, of course, most importantly
on how much a house costs. Let us take as an example the rehabilitated
houses supplied by BCIC, BRL, and IICC. What income would a family need
to be able to buy these houses without any subsidy?
The houses finished recently by BCIC were priced from $9,000 to
$9,500; those at BRL, from $8,000 to $11,000; and those at IICC, from
$8,000 to $11,000. All of these houses meet both FHA 221(h) and local
code enforcement standards. None are luxurious, but all are pleasant
and well-received by their future owners. Ten thousand dollars might
thus be considered typical of the minimum price at which a nonprofit
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organization can supply a rehabilitated urban dwelling unit.
Who can afford these houses depends secondly on what is meant by
"afford." Experts often use the rule of thumb that a family can afford
between 15% and 25% of its annual income for housing. Many families,
particularly low-income families, spend considerably more, but when they
do so they usually do not have enough money left for other necessary ex-
penditures. We will use the figure of 20% here, as does the ownership
bill now before Congress and as do several other governmental programs.
This 20% must cover total housing expense, which includes, in the case
of ownership, principal and interest payments, insurance, taxes, main-
tenance and repairs,' and utilities.
If we -assume that a family buys a $10,000 house from one of the
nonprofit organizations and secures an unsubsidized, 100% mortgage for
25 years at 6 1/2% interest, it will have to pay $811 annually for prin-
cipal and interest. If principal and interest comprise two-thirds of
total housing expense, then annual housing expense will be about $1,200,
or $100 per month. This is in fact representative of the typical pay-
ments made by the families in the ownership projects that had market-rate
mortgages. If we use a 20% housing expense-to-income ratio, a total
annual income of $6,000 will be needed.
If the family had an income of only $5,000, it could afford only
$1,000 per year for housing. Thus, on the $10,000 house discussed with
a 25-year 100% mortgage, for which the total annual expense is $1,200,
it would need an annual subsidy of $200. This is equivalent to saying
that instead of being able to afford $811 a year for principal and in-
terest, the family could afford only $611, which is the payment on a
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25-year $10,000 mortgage at about 3 3/4% interest. In other words, the
Government would have to provide a 3 3/4% mortgage to enable this family
to become a home owner.
The results of similar calculations for various income levels can
be found in the table which follows. As can be seen, the lowest income
level at which a family could afford to buy the $10,000 house is $3,945.
At that income level, the Government would have to supply a subsidy of
$411, and the owner would make an annual mortgage payment of $400, This
is equivalent to a mortgage with a zero interest rate.
TABLE 20
INCOME LEVELS AND SUBSIDIES NEEDED
Principal
Amount Family Can and Interest Equivalent
Annual Afford for Housing Subsidy to Be Paid Interest
Income (20% of income) Necessary by Owner Rate
$6,000 $1,200 $ 0 $811 6 1/2%
*
5,000 1,000 200 611 3 3/4%
4,790 958 242 569 3%
4,000 800 400 411 1/4%
3,945 789 411 400 0
Approximate
The above table should be considered as an. illustration rather
than as the single solution. Many other tables could be worked out if
different assumptions were used. For example, if the mortgages were for
35 years instead of 25, families of lower incomes could become owners.
If the house cost $12,000 instead of $10,000, higher incomes would be
required.
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But these calculations do give a general idea of the magnitudes
which are involved. At somewhere around $6,000, a family can afford to
purchase a minimum rehabilitated house if supplied with a 100% mortgage.
Below about $4,000 a family cannot afford ownership unless it is to be
subsidized with respect to both principal and interest. The relevant
income range to consider in a national home ownership program is thus
about $4,ooo to $6,000.
Of course, if any of these families could afford to make a sub-
stantial down payment, then monthly mortgage payments would be reduced
accordingly. However, it is generally true that families that cannot
afford to purchase homes with market rate mortgages also cannot afford
to make large down payments. A national ownership program should allow
the owner to make as large a down payment as he wishes, but in order to
make ownership feasible for low-income people, it must make 100% financ-
ing consistently available.
For families with incomes between $6,000 and perhaps $8,000, no
interest subsidies are needed. However, ownership will be possible for
these families only if they can obtain mortgages at reasonable interest
rates, and frequently only with small or zero down payments, These are
the families who would benefit from a policy of making mortgage financ-
ing more available in older neighborhoods and to higher risk people. Per-
haps no upper-income eligibility limit should be placed on such a program
at all.
For families with incomes below $4,000, the Government could, if
it wished, subsidize both principal and interest as it does for the
same income families in public housing. However, these are the families
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that are probably least equipped to become home owners, both financially
and socially, and that would present the greatest risks and problems. A
program to make these families home owners might therefore be considered
the third step in a national ownership program. The first step would
be to increase the availability of mortgage financing to families with
incomes above $6,000, and the second step would be to subsidize mortgages
for families with incomes between $4,000 and $6,000. These two steps
could be taken simultaneously, but the third should await the success
of the first two.
Because an ownership program depends so heavily upon the cost of
the available housing, the subsidies needed will vary widely from area
to area. For each area, the subsidies provided and the income limits
established should be determined in accordance with the price of the
minimum decent housing available, whether it is new or existing, rehab-
ilitated or already standard, The family that can afford to purchase a
standard house by paying not more than 20% of its income for total hous-
ing expense1 should receive no subsidies. Families with lower incomes
should receive higher subsidies, up to the point at which all interest
is being subsidized. It could be said generally that such a program
would reach families with incomes from $4,000 to $6,000, but the actual
limits should vary from city to city, just as income limits and subsidies
Total housing expense must include principal and interest pay-
ments, insurance, taxes, maintenance and repairs, and utilities. The
ownership bill now before Congress (S 3029) does not include maintenance
and repairs or utilities, which together may total as much as 35% or
40% of a family's total housing expense. Under S 3029, families would
thus end up spending much more than 20% of their income for housing.
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for public housing and 221(d)(3) moderate-income rental housing do.
Subsidies should also vary with family size, as is the case with
public housing but not with 221(d)(3) or 221(h). Whereas a family with
two -children and an annual income of $5,000 might be able to afford $1,000
per year for housing, a family with ten children could not. The upper
limit for subsidized ownership for a family with ten children might be
$9,000 instead of $6,000. Thus, a family should be allowed an "exemption"
for each dependent before the 20% of its income required for housing is
calculated. In other words, subsidies and income levels should be as
flexible as public housing subsidies and should depend on a combination
of income level, family size, and location.
How do the income ranges arrived at here compare with the ranges
served by other Government housing programs? Public housing serves the
lowest income levels. In 1966, the median total family income in public
housing projects was $2,709. For nonelderly public housing families it
was $3,293, and for elderly families it was $1,500. The maximum income
for -admission for a 4-person family varied from $3,500 in the Fort Worth
2
region to $4,400 in the New York City region. Thus, public housing
serves the families whose income levels are too low for the ownership
program.
Income maximums for the Government's subsidized rental program,
Section 221(d)(3), ranged from $6,450 in the Atlanta SMSA to $8,750 in
3
the New York City SMSA for a 3- to 4-person family. No median income
1 Senate Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs, Hearings,
1967, p. 116.
2 Ibid., p. 117.
3 Ibid., pp. 119-124.
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figures are available. The income range served by subsidized (d)(3) hous-
ing is thus approximately the same as that being recommended for a subsi-
dized ownership program here. However, in the (d)(3) progriam, everyone
pays the same rent, which averages about $104.59 per month, regardless
of income. In other words, a family in (d)(3) housing with an annual in-
come of $5,000 must pay one-quarter of its income for rent, and a $4,000
family must pay over 30%. There are therefore probably a proportionately
small number of~ $4,000 to $5,000 income families in (d)(3) housing. At
the other end of the scale, even the families earning the maximum of
$8,750 benefit from the 3% interest rates.
The ownership program suggested here would provide a mortgage with
0% interest rate for the $4,000 family and would charge the full market
rate for families earning $8,750. In other words, more families would
be able to benefit from the ownership program than presently do from the
rental program, and the subsidies provided would be more flexible and
equitable.
The income limits suggested for the ownership program here are of
the same general magnitude as those now set for Section 221(h), although
the 221(h) limits are difficult to determine precisely because they have
been revised upwards recently. The subsidies are different, however.
Section 221(h) provides a 3% mortgage for every qualified family, regard-
less of income, whereas the ownership subsidies would vary from 0% to
whatever was the market rate of interest.
How would the costs of a home ownership program compare with the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Annual Report,
1965, p. 127.
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costs of the Government's existing housing programs? In public housing,
the Government subsidizes both principal and interest. The average unit
cost $15,894 to build in 1965, and median monthly rent was $44.1 Clear-
ly, an ownership program would cost much less per family..
For Sections 221(d)(3) and 221(h), the Government supplies mort-
gages at 3% interest rate. The proposal here would entail mortgages at
0% to 7%, or whatever the market rate was. This might average out to
be about the same as the 3% (d)(3) and (h) programs. The cost of these
subsidies would depend upon the cost of capital to the Government. Even
if we assume a cost of 6 1/2%, the annual subsidy would not go above $411
per family for a $10,000 house. 2
The total cost of an ownership program would be the sum of (1)
the interest subsidies, (2) the administrative expenses, and (3) the cost
of foreclosures. A study done by the Philadelphia Housing Association
included an estimate of the latter two costs. Using high figures for
foreclosure rates and costs in order to overestimate rather than underes-
timate, it arrived at a figure of $640 per family served by the program.
Amortized over the life of a 25-year mortgage, this amounts to an annual
4
cost of $26. If we add this to the subsidies calculated earlier, the
total cost becomes $26 to $437 per family per year.
This is quite a small figure in relation to the cost of public
1 Ibid., p. 166.
2 See Table 20, p. 127.
Sue Moyerman, p. 31.
See Table 20, p. 127.
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housing, estimated by Eugene Smolensky at $745 per family per year.
It is probably slightly higher than the cost of the 3% (d)(3) program
because of the higher foreclosure rate and risk which would be involved.
However, the median (d)(3) unit costs about $13,000 to build. If rehab-
ilitated, existing homes can be supplied for only $10,000 or $11,000 per
unit by nonprofit sponsors under the ownership program, it might actually
be cheaper to subsidize ownership than rental housing.
The (d)(3) houses might be worth the greater expense, since they
are new rather than rehabilitated houses and may therefore have a longer
life. On the other hand, it is possible that completely gutted and reno-
vated houses like the brick row houses being produced by IICC will have
as long a life as any new house. Even if they don't have as long a life,
however, it might be preferable to provide shorter-lived cheaper housing
which low-income families can afford to purchase than sturdier more ex-
pensive units which they can afford only to rent.
There are two other issues which must be considered in connection
with the subsidies and costs of an ownership program. These are the
possibility that local sponsor organizations may be able to "break even"
and the advisability of reducing subsidies if and when the owner's income
rises.
BRL would like to "break even," or receive back in the form of
fees from the home owners as much money as it spends for administrative
expenses. So far the project has been losing money, but the director
1
Eugene Smolensky, "Public Housing or Income Supplements -- The
Economics of Housing For the Poor," Journal of the American Institute of
Planners, XXXIV, No. 2 (March, 1968), pp. 94-101.
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feels- that when a higher level of operation is reached and more houses
are handled each year, it will be possible to break even. Neither IICC
nor BCIC charges a fee or attempts to recover administrative expenses,
although both were receptive to the idea. Flanner House Homes claims
that it was able to retain a large part of its original donated revolving
fund, but the extent to which this is true cannot be determined.
Breaking even necessarily results in higher prices to the home
owners. If the fee can be charged without raising the cost of ownership
beyond 20% of the family's income, and without bringing the cost beyond
the reach of some low-income families, then there can be no objection
to such a plan. To the extent that such a fee results in higher subsi-
dies, the costs are merely transferred from the local organization to
the Federal Government. If a fee is not charged, then the cost of ad-
ministrative expenses becomes in effect another subsidy to the home owner.
It has not yet been established that a local sponsor can or cannot
break even or that such a plan is or is not advisable. To date, most of
the administrative expenses have been financed by donations and grants.
These funds are difficult to obtain and limited in quantity, If the
Government wishes to pursue an ownership policy on a national scale, it
must be prepared to provide some of the administrative funding itself, at
least initially.
What about lowering subsidies as income rises? This question was
posed to the directors at each of the ownership projects visited, Some
responded that it was a terrible idea; it would be just like public hous-
ing, or just like welfare. Others said it might be a good idea, if it
did not impose a large burden on the owner, since it would enable a given
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amount of subsidy funding to be spread among more home owners-.
The fact is that reducing interest subsidies would not be just
like public housing nor like welfare, although it may sound similar. In
public housing, a family is forced to leave when its income rises above
a given maximum. Under the ownership program, the owner would maintain
his house and never pay more than the market rate of interest,
Traditional welfare programs require that for every extra dollar
earned by the welfare recipient, the subsidy be reduced by a dollar,
Thus, welfare has acted as a 100% income tax. The ownership program,
on the other hand, would require that for every extra dollar earned,
the subsidy be reduced by 20 cents, until the market interest rate was
reached.
The chief drawback to a system of declining subsidies is that it
sounds like an incentive-destroyer. It must be made clear to the fami-
lies that they will not be taxed for every dollar they earn, and that
the maximum they will have to pay for ownership is X dollars. Inasmuch
as such a system would enable more families to become home owners, and
would reduce costs to the Government, it seems advisable.
E. Geographical Focus
BCIC, BRL, and IICC are quite similar with respect to their goals
of helping low-income families become home owners and of upgrading the
physical condition of the housing stock.1 The major difference between
the three groups lies in their geographical focus for improving neighbor-
1 Flanner House Homes and Lincoln Estates, which built new neigh-
borhoods rather than -rehabilitated existing neighborhoods, will not be
included in this discussion.
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hoods. BCIC works entirely within a 9-block deteriorating.center-city
area; BRL operates anywhere in the Rochester metropolitan area; and
IICC is hoping eventually to cover a major portion of the slums of
Philadelphia by entering a neighborhood at a time.
BCIC was established with the dual purpose of aiding low-income
families and upgrading a slum area. BRL, on the other hand, was founded
to help low-income families become home owners wherever they chose to
live. BRL may be improving the entire city of Rochester by rehabilitat-
ing homes and converting them to owner-occupancy all over the city, At
the same time, however, it may be accelerating the decline of the worst
slums by helping the most upwardly mobile and successful families to
leave. IICC also is not limited to a strict geographic area. However,
the home owners it sells to come from the same blocks, and it works only
in deteriorating central-city areas. With respect to the choice of kinds
of homes and locations offered, IICC is thus similar to BCIC rather than
to BRL.
The opposite approaches taken by BCIC and BRL reflect a basic
dilemma which is common not only to home ownership projects but also to
every kind of welfare program aimed at helping low-income families and
the areas in which they live. The goals of helping people and improving
neighborhoods, although both laudable, are not necessarily complementary
or even compatible. The best way to assist low-income families might be
to forget about the slums they live in and encourage them to move to
better neighborhoods, whereas the best way to upgrade a neighborhood
might be to force out all the low-income families and build luxury apart-
ments. As the results of the original urban renewal projects have proven,
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upgrading a neighborhood may not be at all the same thing as assisting
the people who live there.
A project devoted to helping families to become home owners which
also attempts to improve a slum area by converting it to owner-occupancy
may not be choosing the best method for helping the families, Even if
the houses are rehabilitated, the neighborhood may continue to be unpopu-
lar because of its location or image. If so, property values in the area
will remain low. For example, BCIC's 9-block neighborhood is in an un-
desirable area of the city, next to a monstrous decaying public housing
project.- Vacancy rates for low-priced housing in the city of St. Louis
in general are high. As a result', the BCIC home owners, who paid from
$9,000 to $9,500 for their newly-renovated spacious homes, could probably
not sell them on the open market for more than $2,000,l
In addition, encouraging families to purchase homes in declining
areas may mean saddling low-income families with conditions under which
an intelligent middle-class purchaser would'never think of living. De-
clining areas are notorious for their poor level of city services, high
crime and vandalism rates, poor quality schools, etc. In these older
neighborhoods, as discussed before, tax assessments may be disproportion-
ately high, and mortgage financing and property insurance are usually
difficult to obtain.
To attempt to upgrade a slum neighborhood by encouraging low-income
families to purchase homes there is to place the burden of urban renewal
on families already laden with other burdens. Traditionally, the im-
However, BCIC could buy the house back for what the owner paid
and resell it to a new 221(h) owner.
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provement of neighborhoods has been a tool for assisting the families
that live in them. The tool must not now be confused with the goal.
The residents of low-income areas should not become the means for achiev-
ing a desired end for the physical area. Instead, low-income families
should be helped to purchase homes in the best areas they can afford and
want to live in, and the slums they.leave should then be upgraded in
whatever way is most appropriate for the area.
Trying to pursue the two aims of helping people and improving an
area with the same measures can lead to operational problems. Does help-
ing people mean helping the people already in the area? If so, what if
these people cannot afford home ownership? Or what if they dontt want
to buy homes in the area, but would rather move out? Perhaps, then,
helping people means helping any people who want to move into the area.
If so, should there be income limits? Or should the best possible fami-
lies be encouraged to move in? In other words, as stated before, the
best way to assist families is not always the best way to upgrade a
neighborhood.
What about the argument that encouraging low-income families to
live in the best housing they can find will lead to a further decline in
the slums? The answer is that a decline may occur, but it should be
solved by other than low-income families. Each family should be helped
to move to the best housing it wants and can afford. If there is no
better housing available, or if the families do not want to move, then
the slum neighborhood should be rehabilitated. If all of the families
can move out and no one else wants to move in, then the area might be
turned into a park or a shopping center. But the needs of the physical
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area must always be considered as subsidiary to the needs of people.
There are times when the goals of helping low-income families to
become home owners and upgrading a slum neighborhood may coincide. For
instance, the low-income families may not want to move out of- their
neighborhood because they like living there, or because they have always
lived there, or because they want to remain near their jobs. Or there
may be no other housing in the city which the families can afford to
purchase; only through the rehabilitation of the slum houses can they
become home owners.
There are also times when it might be decided that improving the
neighborhood should be the end rather than the means. The neighborhood
might be central to a whole area which is threatening to deteriorate,
or it might have a symbolic or politically strategic significance. It
might be felt that a showcase should be made out of the neighborhood,
even if this leads to risks for the low-income home owners, or even if
it becomes necessary to move out all of the present residents and replace
them with middle-income families.
Usually, then, a home ownership program should help low-income
families to purchase the best homes they want and can afford anywhere in
the city. Occasionally, given different goals, or a combination of goals,
it might be decided to encourage home ownership only within a limited
slum neighborhood. What is important is to make one's goals explicit,
and to make one's choices with full knowledge of the costs and dilemmas
involved. It may be misleading to claim unthinkingly, as was claimed
of 221(h), that a single program is going "to upgrade neighborhoods, to
salvage basically sound houses, and guide and counsel families of modest
means in achieving successful home ownership."
F. Houses to Be Purchased
In general, low-income families should be encouraged to buy the
best quality houses they can afford. Poorly-built or cheaply-rehabili-
tated houses often turn out to be more expensive in the long-run than
higher-priced sound housing. Unexpected expenditures on such things as
a new roof or heating system are damaging to anyone's budget, and can
be especially dangerous-to low-income families who have little resources
or savings set aside for an emergency.
The most effective way to avoid the danger of expensive maintenance
and repairs is to use the best contractors available for rehabilitation
and to provide the low-income family with a good quality house at the
time of purchase. This was the lesson which BCIC learned when it tried
using neighborhood labor for rehabilitation, and when it rehabilitated
only partially before the advent of 221(h). BCIC now uses only profes-
sional contractors, the best available, and renovates to meet very high
standards.
New housing in general presents fewer maintenance problems and
hidden repairs than does existing housing. However, it is usually much
more expensive and in most cases is beyond the price range of the low-
income family. There is no reason to limit a home ownership program to
either existing or new housing; any standard house which the family
wishes to purchase and can afford should be included.
1 P.N. Brownstein, quoted in KUD News Release, Feb., 6, 1968.
2 Sweat equity may be an exception to this rule.
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If an ownership program does use existing housing, should it be
allowed to use only existing housing which is substandard and will be
rehabilitated? If the substandard housing is in inferior neighborhoods
and can never be renovated to be as good as the standard existing hous-
ing, and if standard housing is available, then the substandard should
not be used. If, on the other hand, the substandard housing is in the
minority in a good neighborhood, and if it can be rehabilitated well,
it should be used. In fact, there is an advantage to acquiring and re-
habilitating substandard units: the supply of standard low-cost housing
is increased. To generalize, then, an ownership program should not be
limited to substandard housing, just as it should not be limited to
existing housing; but other things being equal, rehabilitated substandard
housing should be preferred to standard housing.
In some cities, it might be less expensive or more desirable to
use multi-family rather than single-family dwellings. In New York City,
for example, only condominiums or cooperatives are feasible. In a city
like Boston, where triple-deckers abound, either condominiums and co-
operatives could be used, or the low-income family could buy the house
as a resident-landlord. As a resident-landlord, the family would acquire
a new source of income. In addition, the tenants would in most cases
benefit from having a resident- rather than absentee-landlord,
Is there a supply of low-priced housing sufficient to accommodate
a low-income home ownership program? Or would such a program increase
the demand for minimum standard housing so greatly that prices would
be driven beyond the means of low-income families, even if the families
were assisted by an ownership subsidy?
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The Philadelphia Housing Association's study included a gross
analysis of the supply of housing which would be available for a national
1
ownership program. Only homes which were renter-occupied, single-
family, inside metropolitan areas, and not classified as dilapidated
were considered as available. For each of these houses, a value was
calculated as equal to 70 times the.gross monthly rent listed in the
Census. It was admitted that this was a weak way to figure value, but
no better way could be found, and it was assumed that this method would
yield an acceptable approximation for the U.S. as a whole.
According to this analysis, there are about 3 1/2 million rented
units in metropolitan areas which could be purchased for less than
$9,000. This would be more than adequate for the 1.6 million renter
families that the Philadelphia Housing Association calculated would par-
ticipate in a national ownership program. Supply and demand were com-
pared for the individual regions of the U.S. and for selected metro-
politan areas as well as for the U.S. as a whole. It was concluded that
supply would be inadequate for demand only in the New England region and
in the New York and Chicago SMSA's.
This analysis made many simplifying assumptions which may not be
true, and ignored other factors which may be vital. For instance, the
absentee-landlords might not want to sell their houses. Or the houses
available might require so much rehabilitation that even though they
could be purchased for $5,000, they might be far beyond the financial
means of lowr-income families. While the results of the Philadelphia
Housing Association analysis might be regarded as suggestive, it is
therefore better to look at the experiences of the ownership projects
1 Sue Moyerman, pp, 16-23.
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for practical evidenCe.
BRL, BCIC, and IICC have all had no problem finding an adequate
supply of houses to buy, nor have they found that they have been driving
prices up. Of course, these projects are operating on a far smaller
scale than would be achieved by a national program, However, even BCIC
and IICC, which are trying to buy all of the houses within a given area,
have not found that they have caused an increase in prices.
BCIC has been paying from $500 to $2,000 to acquire each unit
almost since the project began. Apparently prices have not increased
because no one but BCIC is interested in purchasing the houses. If the
absentee-owner does not sell to BCIC, he probably will not.sell at all.
BCIC recently obtained the power of eminent domain, under a unique Mis-
souri law. However, it has not yet found it necessary to exercise this
power.
According to the directors at IICC, their program has driven
prices down rather than up. When they acquire and rehabilitate a house,
they resell it to a family living on the block. This family then moves
from its rented house, creating a vacancy for the absentee-landlord.
But the minute a house becomes vacant, it is vandalized. The more
houses IICC buys, the more vacancies are created as IICC "empties out"
the rental units. This leads to more problems for the absentee-owners
in maintaining and renting their homes, and they become willing to sell
their houses at even lower prices.
The vacancy rates in both the BCIC and IICC areas are quite high.
Perhaps if there were a housing shortage, the situation would be differ-
ent. But as long as an ownership project continues to work in a slum
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area where demand for purchase is low or negligible, the project will
probably not be faced with rising prices. And if it operates over the
entire city as a whole, the effect will be dissipated over a large num-
ber of units, and any resulting price increase would probably be quite
small. Until a national ownership program reaches large proportions,
it will not have a significant effect on prices. At the point that it
does, it can be judged whether the cost of increasing subsidies to meet
the higher prices would be worth the expected benefits.
G. Role of the Sponsor Organization
The staffs of BCIC, BRL, and IICC perform three main functions.
They screen and select potential home owners, find and rehabilitate
houses, and provide ownership training, general guidance, and other so-
cial services. In addition, they serve as originators and administra-
tors of the programs, collecting the necessary funding, arranging for
mortgages for the home owners, negotiating for lower insurance and tax
rates, etc. The first three functions would have to be performed by
any local group which'wished to encourage low-income ownership; the
latter would hopefully no longer be necessary, or would be greatly re-
duced, if an ownership program were institutionalized on a national
scale.
The work done by a local sponsoring organization requires several
types of skills and talent. Each of the groups has a director, who seems
to need a knowledge of-housing and poverty problems, an acquaintance
with government, and some familiarity with financing and business methods,
as well as administrative ability. Someone on the staff must know a
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great deal about rehabilitation and construction, and a third member
should be skilled at interviewing low-income families and dealing with
their problems. At BCIC, this third function is filled by a Negro woman
who was BCIC's first home owner. At IICC, clergymen do the screening,
and at BRL it is handled by local volunteers. In addition, all of the
groups have found it advantageous to have board members who are as in-
fluential in the community as possible, to help with funding, obtaining
mortgage and loan commitments or lower insurance and tax rates, and
other.functions which so far have depended on personal connections and
informal arrangements.
Most of the projects began with very ambitious ideas about the
social services they would provide. BCIC's program originally included
at least 21 related services, ranging from employment counseling to a
neighborhood coffee house, from medical aid to a community newspaper.
Some of these services were to be conducted by BCIC, others by local co-
operating agencies. BCIC has now decided to concentrate on budget coun-
seling, and maintains an informal employment service. When the community
becomes more established, another attempt will be made at a community
organization.
BRL has a "one-to-one" program in which middle-class families are
paired with the new home owners and advise them on housekeeping and
maintaining a house. BRL also has an arrangement with a local service
organization which provides financial counseling to the home owners, and
it is trying to work out more arrangements with other local organizations.
Lincoln Estates concentrated on budget and employment counseling and
provided general guidance to anyone who wished it. Flanner House Homes
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conducted a series of educational seminars to prepare the families for
ownership and ran a series of sewing and reupholstering classes for the
wives while the husbands were constructing their houses. The IICC
clergymen spend up to eight months counseling the new home owners, help-
ing them primarily with budget, credit, and marital problems. IICC also
requires that each family allow a professional homemaker to visit it in
its new home in order to provide advice about housekeeping.
Most of the groups intend to set up more social services. They
would like to have neighborhood councils, nursery schools, day-care cen-
ters, job-training programs, and other similar services. In fact, the
tone of most of the directors when discussing social services was one of
guilt for not providing more and better programs. They feel that they
should "cater to the total needs of the family" and are sorry that they
have not been able to do so.
In trying to provide a multiplicity of services at once with
limited staff and funding, the home ownership projects run the risk of
spreading themselves too thin, as BCIC did. Many of the programs they
have tried have been of limited success; a proliferation of such pro-
grams can only be less successful. The ownership groups are now develop-
ing expertise in an important and difficult area, that of rehabilitating
homes and helping low-income families to become home owners. There is
no reason that they should feel guilty because they are not also able
to run nursery schools or job-training programs.
The two services most necessary and relevant for successful owner-
ship, as discussed before, seem to be budget and. employment counseling.
Because there are few local organizations equipped to provide budget
and credit counseling, this function must usually be performed by the
147
ownership project itself. Often it can be done by the same person who
does applicant interviewing, or by any other member of the staff who
can establish close contact with the neighborhood families. Most of
the advice which is needed is quite elementary and requires no sophisti-
cated knowledge of accounting or finances; the primary lesson the fami-
lies need to learn is that money can be budgeted.
Employment counseling often takes more knowledge and is usually
already provided in the community. The best way to deal with this,
then, is to refer people who need jobs or job-training to the already-
existing employment agencies. Referral also seems to be the best way
to help mothers looking for day-care centers, or families needing medi-
cal or legal aid, etc.
What about a home ownership program which does not work through
a local sponsor organization at all? Subsidized mortgages could be
given to low-income families directly, just as Section 203 mortgages are
given to middle-income families directly. After all, the local groups
represent an extra step, an extra foot of red tape, and an extra admin-
istrative expense in the ownership-process.
There are many arguments against such a plan. In the first place,
issuing subsidized mortgages ignores some of the encouragements for
ownership which have proven to be useful and successful, such as sweat
equity or leasing for a trial period. Secondly, who would perform the
functions now performed by the local sponsors? Who would screen and se-
lect potential owners, who would find and rehabilitate houses for them,
and who would provide budget counseling and arrange for referral for
other services? The FRA has proven to be insensitive to screening and
148
interviewing low-income families. If there were no sponsor to rehabili-
tate homes, the families might often select substandard housing, and
the supply of decent housing would not be increased. And finally, in
the absence of credit counseling and general guidance, the rate of fore-
closures and unsuccessful ownership, which has so far been kept extremely
low, would undoubtedly rise sharply. Low-income families have usually
owned little in their lives, and particularly not a home; they are for
the most part unsophisticated purchasers and owners, and need guidance,
especially at the outset.
If a particular family does not need guidance, the local sponsor
does not have to supply any. But the majority will benefit from help,
and for these families a local sponsor is essential. It seems unlikely
that a sponsor could not be found in almost every city where an owner-
ship program is to be conducted, despite the long hours and multitude of
problems involved in the job. The number of sponsor groups which have
already sprung up around the country is amazing, particularly since each
one has had to find its own funding and mortgage sources and usually did
not even know of the existence of the others. If necessary, the national
ownership program could be conducted through the local model cities
agency, or even the housing or renewal agency. But with Federal advice
and assistance and with the availability of subsidized mortgages, it is
likely that a sponsor group could be found or established wherever needed.
Certainly in the initial or experimental stages of a national ownership
program, it is vital that such groups exist.
See for example David Caplovitz, The Poor Pay More (New York:
The Free Press, 1967).
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR A NATIONAL HOME OWNERSHIP PROGRAM
Within the next year or two, the United States is likely to enact
a national program to encourage home ownership by low-income people.
Senator Charles Percy brought the idea for such a program to national
prominence in 1967, and in 1968 President Johnson included a home owner-
ship program among his own housing proposals. The Congress now seems
to assume that home ownership will form a significant part of any new
housing legislation that is passed. It is therefore crucial to analyze
whatever knowledge and experience already exist about low-income home
ownership, in order that the new legislation be as sound and effective
as possible.
The conclusions reached in this thesis suggest that a national
home ownership program can be justified on grounds other than the poli-
tical climate. First, there is a significant unfulfilled demand for
home ownership among low-income people. The five ownership projects
studied here have all encountered a surplus of applicants, even with
little publicity.
Second, the ownership projects have provided several financial
benefits for their home owners. The projects have been able to help
low-income families become the owners of decent housing at approximately
the same monthly cost that the families were previously paying to rent
substandard dwellings. Ownership has also acted as a form of forced
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savings, resulting in a growing equity position for the family.
Thirdly, the ownership projects have produced an increase in the
supply of standard low-cost housing units, either through rehabilita-
tion or new construction. The low-income owners have for the most part
maintained their homes in excellent condition, certainly in better con-
dition than they maintained the units they formerly rented.
In addition, it is possible that home ownership has had intangi-
ble effects on the owners and on the neighborhoods in which they live.
Ownership may have raised the family's aspiration level or improved its
home life,and may have resulted in an upgrading of the general quality
of the neighborhood. However, it cannot be proven that such effects,
if they have occurred, have been the result of ownership alone. It is
better for the present not to have overly-high expectations for an own-
ership program. A significant contribution will have been made even
if an ownership program achieves nothing more than the provision of de-
cent housing to low-income families at the same prices that they were
formerly paying for substandard dwellings.
Home ownership can have disadvantages for the low-income family.
There is the danger that the value of the house may drop sharply, the
possibility that expensive unexpected repairs may be needed, the threat
of foreclosure if every mortgage payment is not made on time, and the
relative lack of mobility that results from ownership. There are ways
to reduce the probability that such dangers will occur. Sound houses
purchased in good neighborhoods have less chance of declining in value
or requiring expensive repairs, and are easier to sell quickly. Steady
employment and insurance against illness, accident, and death can reduce
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the threat of foreclosure.
These options, however, are often not open to low-income families.
Sound houses in good neighborhoods may be beyond their means, even
with the assistance of below-market interest rate mortgages. An owner-
ship program will frequently be forced to operate in a transitional or
gray area, where the possibility that property values will drop and
homes be difficult to sell is relatively high. Low-income families in
many cases cannot afford adequate insurance. In most cases, their jobs
are the least stable; unskilled occupations in general have the high-
est unemployment rates and are the first to be laid off.
The risks involved in a low-income ownership program can be re-
duced by such measures as renting for a trial period, sweat equity,
and ownership counseling. Low-income ownership, however, will always
involve higher risks than middle- or upper-income ownership. The costs
of subsidizing such risks will have to be weighed against the potential
social benefits.
The analysis done here of the five ownership projects provided
conclusions about the methods a national ownership project should follow
as well as about the justifications for it. The projects have found
that the screening and selection of potentially successful home owners
is a crucial procedure. Steadiness of employment and past credit
record, as determined on an individual basis suitable for a low-income
family, seem to be the best criteria to use in selection. Marital sta-
bility is also an important indicator, but it is an extremely difficult
factor to determine.
The first step to take in encouraging ownership seems to be the
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provision of low down payment, long term mortgages at market interest
rates to families in the $6,000 to $8,000 range.1 These families can
afford ownership without subsidies but often cannot obtain liberal
financing because of their incomes or because they are buying homes in
older neighborhoods.
For families with incomes of about $4,000 to $6,000, the sub-
sidization of mortgage interest rates seems to be the credit mechanism
with the most potential for encouraging ownership. Mortgages with zero
down payment are already, and must continue to be, available, The effect
of lengthening present maximum mortgage maturities would be slight.
Once a program of subsidizing interest rates has proven to be success-
ful, then a program which would subsidize principal as well as interest
for families with incomes below $4,000 might be considered.
The ownership projects have found other mechanisms besides credit
manipulation to be useful in encouraging low-income ownership. These
mechanisms include sweat equity, counseling and ownership training, re-
ferral to employment and other social service agencies, and leasing for
a trial period. Mortgage foreclosure insurance or a limited moratorium
on mortgage payments have never been tried but might be quite effective.
The provision of interim financing and funds for administrative expenses
by the Federal Government would reduce operating costs for the local
sponsor organizations, which in turn would reduce the cost of ownership
for the low-income family. The experience of the ownership projects
suggests that the existence of a local nonprofit sponsor is essential,
1 The income ranges cited here are meant to be indicative rather
than specific. They should vary with family size and location.
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at least for the initial stages of a new national program.
The ownership projects have proven that it is possible to rehabi-
litate or construct houses cheaply enough to allow low-income families
to purchase them, and that low-income families can become successful
home owners. There have been very few foreclosures and extremely low
rates of mortgage delinquency. The owners have maintained their homes
in good condition, have been able to afford the necessary repairs and
other costs of ownership, and in general are eager to accept the oppor-
tunity to become home owners.
But the successes of the private ownership projects around the
country have so far been on a relatively minute scale. In its fifteen
years of operation, Flanner House Homes was able to help only 366 fam-
ilies, or 24 families a year, to become home owners. BCIC has produced
19 owners a year, BRL 25, and IICC 12 during its first year. Hundreds
of thousands of dollars in administrative expenses and hundreds of thou-
sands of man-hours have gone into helping these 500 families to become
home owners. As it has been conducted so far, low-income home ownership
has been an extremely labor-intensive and time-consmning process.
If the Government wishes to repeat the successes of the private
projects on a significant scale, it will have to institutionalize the
ownership process. It must (1) establish and oversee a local framework
through which to conduct the national program, and (2) provide interim
and mortgage financing and perhaps administrative expenses to the local
sponsors. The overseeing or advisory function will be important because
the private ownership projects presently operate in a vacuum, largely
unaware of each other's successes and failures, strengths and weaknesses.
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Several functions should be carried out at the local level. Free
ownership advice and counseling should be made available to any family
that wants it. Liberal mortgages should be provided for families who
do not need subsidies but who have been unable to secure such financ-
ing. It would be logical for these two functions to be conducted by
the local FHA, perhaps at new site offices, because the FHA is an es-
tablished governmental organization which presently does similar work.
However, the local FHA offices may be too established; if they are not
willing to give up their conservative and profit-oriented outlook, then
it will be necessary to establish a new organization.
Local nonprofit sponsors similar to those studied in this paper
should be in charge of helping the families who need subsidized mort-
gages. They should also provide programs such as sweat equity and leas-
ing for a trial period for families who need and want them. These spon-
sors would fill the same role filled by the projects studied here but
would be freed from the need to search for financing. The directors of
the projects believe that it is the difficulty of obtaining funding and
mortgage financing which has kept them from expanding at a much greater
rate. There seems to be no shortage of houses which can be acquired or
of families who want to become home owners. With the difficulty of ob-
taining financing removed and with the advice and coordination of the
Federal Government, an ownership program would at least stand a better
chance of reaching the large scale which seems warranted by the success
of the private groups.
Certain of the decisions as to how to conduct a home ownership
program should be left up to the local sponsors, at least initially.
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Such decisions include, for example, the extent to which sweat equity
or leasing for a trial period will be used. Until further experience
has been gained, no single formula can be prescribed. Other decisions,
such as the kind of housing to be purchased, the geographical focus of
the program, and the income limits established, must always be made lo-
cally, on the basis of housing conditions in the area.
The United States is a nation of home owners, as far as middle-
income and upper-income families are concerned. Yet the governmental
housing programs for low-income families have, with minor exceptions,
been restricted to rental housing. The conclusions of this study sug-
gest that there is a demand for an ownership program, and that such a
program can provide several benefits for the low-income family. To be
successful, the program must be established without overly-high expecta-
tions and must be properly conducted. If these conditions are fulfilled,
there seems to be a significant role which a national program to en-
courage low-income home ownership can play in the housing policy of the
United States.
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APPENDIX
THE 50 QUESTIONS DISCUSSED AT EACH OF THE HOME OWNERSHIP PROJECTS
1. How many houses have you done, and what stage are they in? When
did you begin? How long did it take you to get going?
2. How did you get started? What are you trying to do (goals)?
3. How many people applied? Who were they? Where were they living,
and how much rent were they payting? How did they hear about the
program?
4. How many of the applicants were acceptable? How many did you ac-
cept? How many would you have taken if you had unlimited finances?
How many could you get? Was there a lot of desire for or interest
in home ownership?
5. How did you screen homeowners? What criteria did you use for
choosing? What criteria do you recommend? Who did the screening?
6. Do you have information about the families you accepted - income
level, race, jobs, etc.? Do you have any other printed material?
7. What is income level, job pattern, family structure?
8. How much do you pay for the houses? How do you find them? Why
did you decide to work only in one neighborhood? Why this neigh-
borhood? Who owned the houses before you bought them?
9. Have you driven up prices? How many more houses like this can
you buy? Do you intend to buy in this neighborhood? What was the
vacancy rate in the neighborhood?
10. If you don't work in one neighborhood, where are the houses? What
are your criteria for selecting them? What problems arise from not
having any geographical focus?
11. How much does rehab cost? Do you meet a set of standards - FHA or
code enforcement, your own, etc.? Are you satisfied with this level
of rehab? Are the owners?
12. Who does the rehab? Union labor? Neighborhood labor? Negro con-
tractors? How long does rehab take? What are the chief problems?
13. What is the final sales price? Does this include a fee for you?
14. How are you being financed? How do you like this arrangement? Any
government help? Have you thought of applying for 221(h) or any
other government program? Why? How do you like 221(h)? Red tape?
Would you like to participate in a national home ownership program?
Are you breaking even now?
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15. How much does it cost you to run this program? Do you have ex-
pense statements?
16. What kind of mortgages do owners get - who gives them, what down
payment, length, interest rate? Does owner pay closing costs?
Where do you get financing before owner moves in?
11. What are the monthly mortgage payments? Total housing expenses?
What does this include?
18. What would be the effect of changing down payment, interest rate,
length of mortgage? Do you think your terms are the best?
19. What is the income level of the owners? Do you have income limits?
Are they all employed? Any welfare mothers? What % black?
20. Could you lower income limit (minimum) and still get good owners?
Do you think you should raise it?
21. What effect has home ownership had on the neighborhood? Any evi-
dence?
22. What effect has home ownership had on owners? Any evidence?
23. How.many families keep their houses in good condition? Is this
due to ownership? How many make mortgage payments on time? Is
lateness extended or brief? How do you handle it?
24. Can you see a difference between the families who have kept up
their houses and mortgage payments and those who have not? Could
you have told beforehand?
25. How many failureshave there been? Are all other houses in hands
of original owners?
26. Reasons for failures? Did all result in foreclosure? How much
does foreclosure cost? What happened? Can you prevent failures?
Could you have predicted them beforehand?
27. Do you give ownership training or employment counseling, etc.?
Do you have a neighborhood organization? What does it do? What
other social services do you have? How successful have these
been? Who runs and finances them?
28. Does your program involve any sweat equity? Did it ever? Must
every fanily work? Do they want to? How does it work out? How
much does it reduce housing cost? How is equity calculated? If
you don't have sweat equity, did you consider it? What do you
think of using it?
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29. Do families become owners right away? If not, what happens to rent
money? What do you think of a lease-with-option-to-purchase for
1-5 years? When do the families really begin to feel like owners?
30. Is just making mortgage money available enough, or do families
need subsidies, lower down payments, etc.? Are your subsidies
enough? If yours were bigger, could you get more families who
would be good home owners?
31. Do owners have insurance? Property, burglary and theft, unemploy-
ment, health? How much do they cost? Special rates? How do rates
compare with rest of city? How would they without your intervention?
32. What happens when head of family becomes unemployed? What would
you think of a mortgage insurance for owners, for unemployment or
illness, etc.?
33. How much do the following items cost:
taxes and special assessments (special rates?)
utilities
insurance
repairs and maintenance
mortgage principal, interest, and mortgage insurance
34. Where do people work? Near here?
35. How much could an owner sell his house for now? Is he free to do
so? To rent his house out?
36. Does interest rate go up when owner's income rises? What do you
think of such a plan? What about making owner pay back subsidy?
37. What would you think of just giving a cheap mortgage to a low-income
family and letting him live wherever he chose - city or suburb? Of
giving mortgage to him directly, without any nonprofit sponsor?
38. If any of the owners are resident-landlords, are there rent controls?
39. Are all the houses you buy substandard? What would you think of
using standard houses? New houses?
40. Have you thought about condominiums or cooperatives?
hl. Is your project integrated? Why?
42. Could you repeat your program in other parts of the city? How many
houses could you do with unlimited financial resources? How many
would you want to do? Could this program be repeated in other
cities?
43. What was the neighborhood like before you came in? After?
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44. What do you think is the best way to make families into good home
owners?
45. What are the major obstacles keeping you from expanding faster?
46. What % of the neighborhood is owner-occupied? Your owners? How
many houses are there in the neighborhood? Is this % enough to
affect neighborhood? How many would you need?
47. Do you have an emergency repair fund? What would you think of one?
48. Have you had any vandalism? Why?
49. What have been your major problems? What would you do differently
if you could do it over again? What have been the best parts?
50. What suggestions would you make for a national home ownership pro-
gram, on the basis of your experience?
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